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The Supreme Court's June 2013 opinion in United States v. Windsor is
remarkable for its bypassing of standard equal protection doctrine. In striking
down section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act as unconstitutional
discrimination against gays and lesbians, Windsor failed to broach the
question whether sexual orientation constitutes a suspect class; indeed, it
failed even to perform the 'fit" analysis that doctrine demands. Instead, the
Court examined the statute and accompanying legislative materials and
concluded that section 3 violated the Equal Protection Clause 's core command
that government action not be based on animus against a disfavored group.
Windsor's unusually direct methodology conflicts with the Court's
jurisprudence governing Congress's power to enforce the Equal Protection
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Clause. That jurisprudence, requiring that there be "congruence and
proportionality" between enforcement legislation and the constitutional
violation the law targets, has relied heavily on the suspect class status of the
benefitted group. Until very recently, the results of the congruence and
proportionality inquiry were predictable; legislation that enforced the equal
protection rights of suspect or quasi-suspect classes would enjoy deferential
judicial review, while legislation enforcing the rights of nonsuspect classes
would receive a skeptical judicial reception. While recent cases potentially call
this template into question, it remains for now a basic feature of the Court's
Enforcement Clause doctrine.
Windsor, by abjuring suspect class and even 'fit" analysis, undermines the
Court's approach to the enforcement power. This Article examines the
challenge Windsor poses to the Court's Enforcement Clause doctrine. It
argues that Windsor requires the Court to reconsider its approach to the
congruence and proportionality standard. In particular, it argues that
Windsor's more particularized equal protection methodology requires the
Court to consider how Congress may legitimately translate such judicial
pointillism into enforcement legislation's inevitably broader brushstrokes.
It is urgent that the Court consider a new approach to the enforcement
power. Congress either has enacted or is poised to enact several significant
pieces of enforcement legislation benefitting groups whose suspect class status
has not been determined and likely never will. Unless the Court is prepared to
exclude Congress from participating in the equality projects the Court itself
has embarked on, the Court needs to consider how to harmonize its newfound
interest in constitutional pointillism with enforcement legislation's broader
brushstrokes.
This Article suggests such an approach, one that recognizes Congress's
institutional competence and legitimacy to make broad judgments about the
same sort of animus the Court found through its more precisely targeted
inquiry in Windsor. This approach would not immunize enforcement
legislation from judicial review. As explained in this Article, however, this
approach does call for a change in the way the Court performs congruence
and proportionality review. This Article closes by applying this new approach
to a pending piece of enforcement legislation, the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act, which would offer federal employment discrimination
protections to gay and lesbian workers.
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Windsor,' striking down
section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) 2 was remarkable in many
1 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
2 Id. at 2693 (finding that DOMA is motivated by an improper animus against
homosexuals and thus violates due process and equal protection principles); see also
[Vol. 94:367
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ways.3 Yet it was also simply the latest example of the Court's decades-long
trend of ignoring suspect class analysis in equal protection cases. The Court
now has struck down two laws as violating the equal protection rights of gays
and lesbians without even broaching the question whether sexual orientation
constitutes a suspect class.4 This avoidance of the suspect class issue is not an
idiosyncratic feature of sexual orientation cases; the Court has not performed a
serious suspect class analysis - or purported to - in nearly thirty years. To put
that point in more personal terms, no current Justice was sitting the last time
the Court purported to engage in such an analysis. Thus, the current generation
of the Court has not seriously engaged the political process theory that guided
much of the Court's equal protection thinking during the Burger Court.5
In its place, the Court has employed analytical approaches that attempt to
cut through the mediating principles that constitute suspect class analysis. 6
Two examples are particularly notable. First, in its modem race jurisprudence,
the Court has embraced a presumption that the Constitution requires color
Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419-20 (1996). For
convenience, this Article sometimes refers to section 3 of DOMA as simply "DOMA."
References to DOMA should be understood as references only to section 3, unless the
context otherwise clearly indicates.
3 See Ernest Young & Erin Blondel, Federalism, Liberty, and Equality in United States
v. Windsor, 2012-2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 117 (arguing that Windsor constitutes an
unusually sophisticated application of the connection between federalism and individual
rights); infra notes 139-46 and accompanying text (explaining Windsor's deviation from
traditional equal protection "fit" analysis).
4 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695 (striking down section 3 of DOMA as violating the
equality principles of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 635 (1995) (striking down Amendment 2 to the Colorado Constitution as violating the
Equal Protection Clause); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 559, 580 (2003) (striking down
Texas's sodomy law as violating substantive due process); id. at 580 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (agreeing with the result on an equal protection ground).
5 By contrast, from time to time the Court has continued its tendency to employ an
explicitly political process-based approach to dormant Commerce Clause questions. See,
e.g., W. Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 200 (1994) (striking down a combination
neutral tax and local subsidy program, although each component was constitutional by itself
under longstanding precedent, in part because their combination had the effect of removing
in-state industries as natural political opponents of the law).
6 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2716 (Alito, J., dissenting) (explaining that "[tihe modem tiers
of [equal protection] scrutiny . . . are a heuristic to help judges determine when
classifications have that 'fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation,"' which
equal protection requires (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971))); see, e.g., William
D. Araiza, Justice Stevens and Constitutional Adjudication: The Law Beyond the Rules, 44
LoY. L.A. L. REv. 889, 896-933 (2011) (explaining how Justice Stevens's equal protection
and free speech jurisprudence attempted to cut through such mediating principles to apply
actual constitutional law); Allison Moore, Loving's Legacy: The Other Antidiscrimination
Principles, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 163, 167 (1999) (explaining how suspect class
analysis constitutes a set of mediating principles rather than core constitutional law).
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blindness, basing this conclusion on a combination of moral imperative and the
Court's perception of the core meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment with
regard to race.7 Second, in its famous series of "rational basis plus" cases, it
has attempted to discern when discrimination is motivated by illegitimate
animus.8 These disparate approaches share a concern with applying core equal
protection law (as the Court understands that law) rather than deciding cases
based on a decisional heuristic, such as political process theory, that attempts
to approximate the results a court would reach if it were able accurately to
discern and apply equal protection's core meaning.9 Windsor is simply the
most recent - and perhaps most extreme' 0 - example of this more direct
approach to equal protection.
The Court's approach holds both perils and promise for equal protection
doctrine generally. But for current purposes, the importance of the Court's
approach lies in its implications for congressional power to enforce the Equal
Protection Clause - the so-called "enforcement power" or "Section 5 power."'"
Judicial doctrine insists that enforcement legislation be "congruent and
proportional" to the constitutional violation Congress seeks to remedy.' 2 In
stark contrast to its underlying equal protection jurisprudence, the Court's
Enforcement Clause jurisprudence has, at least until very recently, relied
heavily on a group's suspect class status when determining whether
enforcement legislation benefitting that group satisfies the congruence and
proportionality test. The doctrinal template was straightforward: If the
benefitted group was a suspect or quasi-suspect class, "it was easier for
Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations" justifying
enforcement legislation.' 3 If it was not, then Congress's task was more
difficult: It would have to "identify, not just the existence of [discriminatory]
state decisions, but a 'widespread pattern' of irrational reliance on such [non-
suspect] criteria. ' 14
I See infra notes 100-06 and accompanying text (discussing how the Court has reached
its presumptive rule requiring colorblindness).
8 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ct'., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that
mental retardation is not a suspect classification but nevertheless striking down the city's
zoning decision on the ground that it reflected unconstitutional animus against the mentally
retarded).
9 See infra notes 178-79 (explaining the idea of a constitutional heuristic and applying
that concept to equal protection review).
10 See infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text (explaining why Windsor potentially
reflects an unusually explicit version of this approach to equal protection law).
11 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
12 See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (announcing the "congruence
and proportionality" standard).
'3 Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003).
" ld. at 735 (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 90 (2000)).
[Vol. 94:367
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Recently this template has deteriorated. In 2012 the Court held that a
provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) 15 exceeded
Congress's enforcement power, even though the FMLA was enacted to combat
sex discrimination, a phenomenon that triggers heightened equal protection
scrutiny.' 6 In 2013 the Court struck down the coverage formula for the
preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), 17 which protects
against race discrimination in voting.1 8 These decisions depart from the
template described in the previous paragraph in that the Court in these cases
struck down enforcement legislation as exceeding Congress's power even
though the targeted discrimination - respectively, based on sex and race -
triggered heightened judicial scrutiny. 19
Thus, the Court's enforcement power doctrine has entered a potentially
transitional stage. The decision in Windsor confirms that future equal
protection decisions considering equality claims by emerging20 groups will
likely turn less on application of suspect class doctrine and more on the Court's
holistic, if ad hoc and particularized, estimations of the rationality and public-
purpose basis for a challenged law.21 At the same time, the Court's
15 Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994).
16 See Coleman v. Court of Appeals, 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1338 (2012).
17 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
18 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). The relevance of Shelby County
is very slightly more attenuated than that of the other cases discussed in this Article because
of its ambiguous doctrinal foundation. The Court suggested that the constitutionality of the
coverage formula presented questions under both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, see id. at 2622 n.1, although its analysis focused on the Fifteenth
Amendment, see id. at 2619-29 (referring to the Fifteenth Amendment). More relevant for
our purposes, the Court was also notably vague in its statement of the standard by which it
reached its decision to reject the coverage formula. See id at 2622 n.1 (referring to a prior
case, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009), as setting the
applicable standard of review); Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 204 (declining to decide whether the
VRA was properly reviewed under the congruence and proportionality standard).
19 Indeed, in the case of the VRA, the right at issue - voting - is also one that enjoys
heightened protection as a matter of the "fundamental rights strand" of equal protection. See
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (stating that the right to vote is a "fundamental
political right" (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886))); Shelby Cnty. v.
Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 860 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
20 "Emerging" groups in this context means simply groups whose suspect-class status has
not yet been determined by the Court. In most cases, this characteristic traces back to the
fact that the group was not sufficiently visible or organized to mount colorable equal
protection claims during the period when the Court employed suspect class analysis more
regularly. See, e.g., Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1009 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (acknowledging that as of 1985 the
suspect classification status of sexual orientation had not yet been determined by the Court).
21 Of course, lower courts may feel themselves more constrained to apply standard
suspect class doctrine. Indeed, one recent post-Windsor case relied on that decision to
2014]
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Enforcement Clause doctrine, which until 2012 was tied closely to suspect-
class analysis, is possibly entering a state of flux.
The uncertainty caused by the combination of these developments likely
will come to a head soon. At some point in the not-too-distant future, Congress
will likely enact the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA),22 a law
that would ban workplace discrimination (including by state employers) on the
basis of sexual orientation and perhaps gender identity. Although not currently
on the legislative agenda, expansion of federal public accommodations laws to
include sexual orientation is also a possibility.23 Beyond sexual orientation and
transgender identity, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
(GINA), 24 which is already law, restricts discrimination on the basis of one's
genetic makeup. Congress has also expanded the Americans with Disabilities
Act in a way that potentially protects at least some obese persons. 25
While all these laws either are or would be constitutional under the
Commerce Clause, 26 plaintiffs' ability to obtain retrospective relief against
state governments violating these laws rests largely on those laws being upheld
as enforcement legislation.27 But their bona fides as enforcement legislation is
conclude that sexual orientation discrimination requires heightened judicial scrutiny. See
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 481 (9th Cir. 2014) ("In its
words and its deed, Windsor established a level of scrutiny for classifications based on
sexual orientation that is unquestionably higher than rational basis review. In other words,
Windsor requires that heightened scrutiny be applied to equal protection claims involving
sexual orientation.").
22 Employment Non-Discrimination Act, H.R. 1755, 113th Cong. (2013).
23 Other possibilities for federal legislation include guidelines for antibullying programs
in schools (which might include sexual orientation as a protected class) and federal
protection for gay and lesbian adoption and parentage rights. Unlike the legislation
mentioned in the text, these types of laws would presumably have to rest either on
Congress's spending power or its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, given limits
on Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 564 (1995) (suggesting strongly that federal regulation of family law and education
matters would not come within Congress's regulatory power under the Commerce Clause).
The spending power may also be an unsure foundation for such legislation. See cases cited
infra note 29.
24 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat.
881 (restricting employment and insurance discrimination on the basis of genetic
information).
25 See generally Shannon Liu, Note, Obesity as an "Impairment" for Employment
Discrimination Purposes Under the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of
2008, 20 B.U. Pun. INT. L.J. 141 (2010) (considering whether the 2008 amendments to the
Americans with Disabilities Act provide protection for obese persons).
26 But see supra note 23 (suggesting other federal antidiscrimination legislation that the
Commerce power might not support).
27 Compare Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (prohibiting Congress
from making nonconsenting states liable for retrospective relief when legislating under its
[Vol. 94:367
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an open question. None of these classifications - sexual orientation, gender
identity, genetics, or obesity - can claim protection as a suspect class; unless
the Court reverses the course of its equal protection jurisprudence, none of
them ever will. 28 At the same time, despite recent hints to the contrary, the
Court's current Enforcement Clause doctrine requires such protection in order
for these statutes to receive something other than highly skeptical judicial
review. Something has to give.
Even if plaintiffs could obtain full relief for state government violations of
antidiscrimination laws enacted under the Commerce Clause or the Spending
Clause,29 there would remain deeper reasons to worry about the scope of
Congress's enforcement power. Two generations ago, Justices Douglas and
Jackson protested the Court's decision to rely on the Commerce Clause to
invalidate a California law preventing the importation of indigent persons into
the state.30 For Justice Douglas it seemed plain that "the right of persons to
move freely from State to State occupies a more protected position in our
constitutional system than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal
across state lines. '31 Justice Jackson expressed concern that "[t]o hold that the
measure of [a human's] rights is the commerce clause is likely to result
Article I power), with Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (authorizing Congress
to do the same when it legislates under its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment). To
the extent the Spending Clause might authorize such relief as a condition for states receiving
federal funding, recent cases hint at a cutback in that power as well. See cases cited infra
note 29.
28 EvAN GERSTMANN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 69 (2d ed. 2008)
("For all practical purposes the constitutional doctrine regarding suspect classes is a dead
letter.... [T]he Court has no intention of creating any new suspect classes."); Richard E.
Levy, Political Process and Individual Fairness Rationales in the U.S. Supreme Court's
Suspect Classification Jurisprudence, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 33, 44-45 (2010) (remarking that
the Court has not recognized a new suspect class since the mid-1970s); Mark Strasser,
Equal Protection, Same-Sex Marriage, and Classifying on the Basis of Sex, 38 PEPP. L. REv.
1021, 1030 (2011) (hypothesizing that the Court may not recognize any group as a new
suspect class but instead provide gradations within the rational basis inquiry).
29 See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606 (2012) (holding that
Congress exceeded its power under the Spending Clause to attach particular conditions to
Medicare program grants to states through an analysis that suggests more careful scrutiny of
conditional spending grants to states); see also Agency for Int'l Dev. v. Alliance for Open
Soc'y Int'l, 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2331-32 (2013) (holding that Congress violated the First
Amendment when it attached funding conditions on grants to private parties that forced the
recipient to alter its position in programs other than the one funded by the allocated funds).
Under current law, Congress lacks the power to authorize retrospective relief against states
when it legislates under its power to regulate interstate commerce. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S.
at 72-73 (undermining the Commerce Clause authority for the availability of such relief).
30 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177, 181 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at
182 (Jackson, J., concurring).
31 Id. at 177 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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eventually either in distorting the commercial law or in denaturing human
rights." 32
These concerns resonate today. Even if Congress's Article I powers
provided all the power Congress needed to ensure that states respect basic
human rights, lodging that authority securely in the Enforcement Clause
ensures that human rights legislation rests on its appropriate foundation.
Locating that correct foundation ensures that Congress's constitutional
deliberation focuses on how best to secure those rights, rather than on the
interstate commerce effects when those rights are violated. 33 Such deliberation
can only encourage the public constitutional discourse necessary to maintain
ultimate popular sovereignty. This Article is therefore part of a larger project to
ground Congress's power to enforce constitutional rights where it belongs - in
the aptly named Enforcement Clause. 34
This Article surveys the state of Enforcement Clause doctrine in the wake of
Windsor's reaffirmation of the Court's ad hoc, particularized approach to equal
protection. Part I explains the doctrinal developments that have caused the
tension described above. Part L.A begins with a brief description of the
32 Id. at 182 (Jackson, J., concurring).
31 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1964) (examining Congress's
evidence that racial discrimination in public accommodations affected interstate commerce).
" See generally William D. Araiza, Constitutional Rules and Institutional Roles: The
Fate of the Equal Protection Class of One and What It Means for Congressional Power to
Enforce Constitutional Rights, 62 SMU L. REv. 27 (2009) (considering the lessons the equal
protection "class of one" doctrine holds for congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment); William D. Araiza, Deference to Congressional Fact-Finding in Rights-
Enforcing and Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REv. 878 (2013) [hereinafter
Araiza, Deference] (considering the deference due congressional factfindings supporting
rights-limiting and rights-enforcing legislation); William D. Araiza, ENDA Before It Starts:
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Availability of Damage Awards to Gay
State Employees Under the Proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 22 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 1 (2002) (considering whether the Supreme Court would uphold an ENDA
provision prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in employment in light of its
decision in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett); William D. Araiza,
New Groups and Old Doctrine: Rethinking Congressional Power to Enforce the Equal
Protection Clause, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 451 (2010) [hereinafter Araiza, New Groups]
(challenging the Supreme Court's approach to its review of Equal Protection Clause cases
and positing an alternative theory of enforcement power); William D. Araiza, The Section 5
Power After Tennessee v. Lane, 32 PEPP. L. REv. 39 (2004); William D. Araiza, The Section
5 Power and the Rational Basis Standard of Equal Protection, 79 TUL. L. REv. 519 (2005)
(arguing that a broader Section 5 power is appropriate in light of recent equal protection
decisions under the rational basis standard); William D. Araiza, The Troubled Adolescence
of City of Boerne v. Flores, in CONTROVERSIES IN EQUAL PROTECTION CASES IN AMERICA
(Anne Richardson ed.) (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid=2174446 (considering the problems that arise when the Court reviews
enforcement legislation skeptically).
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congruence and proportionality standard and how the Court has applied that
standard since its 1997 introduction in City of Boerne v. Flores.35 That Section
reveals the close connection the Court has drawn between Congress's
enforcement power and the Court's own equal protection doctrine, most
notably its suspect class jurisprudence. Part L.A concludes, however, with a
discussion of recent cases suggesting an erosion of that close connection. Part
I.B next describes the breakdown of the Court's suspect class jurisprudence.
That description culminates with Windsor. Part I.B explains how Windsor
potentially makes a conclusive break with suspect class analysis in favor a
more direct, but particularized, pointillist 36 constitutional methodology.
Part II considers the implications of these developments. It begins by
observing that legislative developments are hastening the arrival of a moment
of truth for the enforcement power.37 With GINA and potential obesity
protections enacted, and ENDA - perhaps with a gender identity component -
under serious consideration, the United States Code may soon feature laws
based on the Enforcement Clause that protect several groups whose suspect
class status is unknown and may never be determined conclusively. Part II then
considers the problem such legislation poses for the Court's current
combination of equal protection and enforcement power jurisprudence. 38 It
explains that courts will find it difficult to apply the congruence and
proportionality test's fundamental requirement - that courts measure the
relationship between enforcement legislation and the targeted constitutional
right - when that right has been identified in the narrow, particularistic way
reflected in Windsor. To the extent Windsor heralds a new approach to equal
protection issues, this difficulty will become widespread.
Part III offers a way forward. It suggests that Windsor reflects the Court's
attempt to read the social meaning of legislation, and to test that meaning
against equal protection's core requirement that government act only in pursuit
of a public purpose. This judicial willingness to read social meaning into
legislation suggests that the Court should respect Congress's performance of
that same function when enacting enforcement legislation. Indeed, such
judicial respect is especially appropriate in light of Congress's superior
capability and legitimacy to perform that task.39 Part III lays out such an
35 521 U.S. 507, 510 (1997) (striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as
violating the newly announced "congruence and proportionality" requirement for
enforcement legislation).
36 See Pierre Courthion, Georges Seurat, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britan
nica.com/EBchecked/topic/536352/Georges-Seurat#ref235846 (last visited Nov. 6, 2013),
archived at http://perma.cc/U6JM-D9RE (explaining that Pointillism is a "technique for
portraying the play of light using tiny brushstrokes of contrasting colors").
31 See infra Part I.A.
38 See infra Part l.B.
39 See Araiza, Deference, supra note 34, at 887-93 (citing expertise and authority as
factors for determining the appropriate amount of deference owed Congress when it finds
2014]
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argument. After summarizing the problem explained in Part 11,40 it translates
Windsor's approach into the very different context of legislative action,4' and
explains how that translation justifies Congress in applying Windsor's
pointillist approach to legislation's inevitably broader brushstrokes. 42 Part III
concludes by applying this approach to a case challenging the Enforcement
Clause bona fides of a hypothetical ENDA statute.
43
I. THE COMING DOCTRINAL COLLISION
A. The Enforcement Clause, the Congruence and Proportionality Standard,
and Suspect Classes
In 1997 the Supreme Court, in the midst of its remarkable campaign to limit
federal power,44 decided City of Boerne v. Flores, and thus introduced the
modem judicial formula governing congressional power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment 45 - the "congruence and proportionality" standard.
While only a component of the Rehnquist Court's larger federalism agenda,
Boerne was nevertheless unique: nearly all of the Court's other major
federalism cases of that era were decided on the same sharply split five to four
votes,46 but Boerne gained adherence across the Court's ideological
facts supporting individual rights legislation).
40 See infra Part III.A.
41 See infra Part III.B.
42 See infra Part III.C.
43 See infra Part III.D.
44 See, e.g., JEROLD WALTMAN, CONGRESS, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY: THE CASE OF CITY OF BOERNE V. FLORES 3 (2013) (discussing how in the 1990s "the
Rehnquist Court was in the midst of what has been called a 'federalism revolution"').
41 Boerne dealt with Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (finding that it is
within Congress's authority to "secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment"
(quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966))). The Court, however, stated its
rule as generally applicable to Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation, and soon
applied Boerne's test to legislation enforcing the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Kimel
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82-83 (2000) (testing the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, enacted to enforce the equal protection rights of elderly people, against
the congruence and proportionality standard).
46 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617, 627 (2000) (holding that
Congress's power to provide a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated
violence is unsustainable under both the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (finding that the
requirement that background checks be conducted on handgun purchasers imposed
unconstitutional obligations on state officers to execute federal laws); Idaho v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 287-88 (1997) (holding that the Tribe's action against the
State of Idaho was barred by the Eleventh Amendment); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) (holding Congress did not have the power under the Indian
[Vol. 94:367
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spectrum. 47 The Court, however, soon split badly along its usual ideological
lines when applying Boerne's standard. Fuller explanations of the Court's
application of the congruence and proportionality standard have appeared
elsewhere in academic literature.48 This Part provides only a partial narrative,
focusing on one aspect of that doctrinal development: the Court's use of its
own suspect class jurisprudence as a key component of its analysis of
legislation enforcing the Equal Protection Clause.
49
Commerce Clause to abrogate the State's Eleventh Amendment Immunity); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566-68 (1995) (finding the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeds
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause). But see New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (holding, by a six-to-three vote, that several provisions of the Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act violated the Constitution's federalism
principles).
" Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court was joined in relevant part by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas (all three of whom were members of the five-
justice bloc that reshaped the Court's federalism jurisprudence in the 1990s), as well as by
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg (both of whom were consistent opponents of the majority's
federalism agenda). Justice O'Connor, joined in part by Justice Breyer, agreed with the
Court's enforcement power analysis, even though they were on opposite sides of the other
major federalism cases of the era. They dissented in Boerne solely because they disagreed
with the scope of the underlying right the enforcement legislation sought to promote. Justice
Souter did not reach the enforcement power question. Thus, no Justice expressly disagreed
with the majority's congruence and proportionality analysis, seven agreed with it fully, an
eighth agreed with it partially, and one expressed no opinion.
48 See generally Rebecca Goldberg, The "How" of Enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment: Why the Rehnquist Court's Treatment of Implementation, Not Interpretation, Is
the True Post-Boeme Failing, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 47 (2007) (arguing that the Supreme
Court's treatment of congressional implementation in Kimel and Garrett, rather than
Boerne, are the sources of Congress's loss of interpretive power under the Rehnquist Court);
Calvin Massey, Two Zones of Prophylaxis: The Scope of the Fourteenth Amendment
Enforcement Power, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (2007) (exploring the scope of Congress's
enforcement power when the abrogation of state sovereign immunity is not at issue);
Michael J. Neary, Reversing a Trend: An As-Applied Approach Weakens the Boerne
Congruence and Proportionality Test, 64 MD. L. REv. 910 (2005) (explaining that the
Supreme Court decision in Lane significantly deviates from the congruence and
proportionality test first enunciated in Boerne, and as a result, undermines the restrictions on
Congress's Section 5 authority); Elisabeth Zoller, Congruence and Proportionality for
Congressional Enforcement Powers: Cosmetic Change or Velvet Revolution?, 78 IND. L.J.
567 (2003) (examining the effects of grounding Congress's enforcement powers in the
congruence and proportionality standard rather than a traditional means-ends test and
comparing the congruence and proportionality test to similar standards of judicial review in
other countries).
49 This focus means that cases dealing with legislation enforcing the Due Process Clause
are either not treated, or considered only in passing. Cf, e.g., United States v. Georgia, 546
U.S. 151, 153 (2008) (considering whether the provisions in the Americans with Disabilities
Act considered in Lane constitute appropriate enforcement legislation in the context of a
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The first case applying the Boerne standard to equal protection enforcement
legislation was Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents. 50 Kimel considered the
Enforcement Clause foundation for the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA). 51 The Court drew a tight connection between the proportionality
prong of the congruence and proportionality test and the equal protection status
of age discrimination. After reviewing the Court's age discrimination
jurisprudence, the Court concluded:
Judged against the backdrop of our equal protection jurisprudence, it is
clear that the ADEA is "so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or
preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or
designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior." The Act, through its
broad restriction on the use of age as a discriminating factor, prohibits
substantially more state employment decisions and practices than would
likely be held unconstitutional under the applicable equal protection,
rational basis standard. 52
The Court then rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the ADEA's limitations
and exceptions restricted the statute's reach to the point that it prohibited only
the arbitrary age discrimination that would fail rational basis review if
challenged under the Equal Protection Clause itself.53 Throughout this analysis,
then, the focus remained on the relationship between the statute's scope and
the Court's rule that age discrimination violated the Constitution only if it
failed rational basis review.54
claim that a prison has violated the plaintiffs Eighth Amendment rights); Tennessee v.
Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 513 (2004) (considering whether the public accommodations provisions
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, as applied to access to courthouses, constitute
appropriate legislation enforcing the Due Process right to access to the judicial process); Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Sav. Plan v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999)
(considering whether a federal law making states liable for patent violations was appropriate
legislation enforcing the Due Process Clause). One equal protection enforcement case this
Article does not discuss is United States v. Morrison, where the Court rejected the
enforcement power foundation for the Violence Against Women Act. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
The Court in that case rested its decision on the statute's regulation of private, rather than
state, conduct. See id. That reasoning raises an issue that lies beyond the scope of this
Article.
50 528 U.S. 62, 82-86 (2000).
51 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 7, 81 Stat.
602, 604-05 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634), invalidated in part by Kimel,
528 U.S. 62.
52 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86 (citation omitted) (quoting City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 536 (1997)).
53 Id. at 86-88.
54 At the end of its analysis, the Court conceded that the ADEA might still be
constitutional if Congress had identified a serious age discrimination problem that required a
powerful prophylactic remedy. It concluded, however, that Congress had not demonstrated
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A year later, in Board of Trustees of the University ofAlabama v. Garrett,55
the Court took the next step in elevating its scrutiny of enforcement legislation
protecting the equal protection rights of non-suspect classes. Garrett
considered the enforcement power bona fides of the employment provisions of
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).5 6 While disability, like age, had
been identified by the Court as a non-suspect class,5 7 two factors made the
Court's consideration of the ADA a more complicated enterprise than its
relatively quick dismissal of the ADEA in Kimel. First, the Court's underlying
equal protection jurisprudence sent a more ambivalent message about disability
discrimination. 58 Second, in the ADA Congress compiled a more detailed
record of state government discrimination.59 These features forced the Court to
build on its analysis in Kimel.
The first problem facing the Garrett Court - the equal protection status of
disability discrimination - arose from the fact that sixteen years earlier, in City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,60 the Court, while finding that the
mentally retarded did not constitute a suspect class, 6 1 nevertheless applied what
judges62 and commentators 63 agreed was a stricter version of rational basis
review. Relegating the matter to a footnote, the Garrett Court brushed off the
argument that Cleburne's unusually stringent review reflected anything other
than application of traditional rational basis scrutiny.64
the existence of a serious problem with states engaging in age discrimination. Id. at 90-91
("A review of the ADEA's legislative record as a whole ... reveals that Congress had
virtually no reason to believe that state and local governments were unconstitutionally
discriminating against their employees on the basis of age.").
55 Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
56 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 502, 104 Stat. 327,
370, invalidated in part by Garrett, 531 U.S. at 356.
57 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366 (reaffirming the Court's holding in Cleburne that mental
retardation is not a suspect class).
51 See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text (reviewing the general understanding
that the Court had previously applied a stricter than usual rational basis test to legislation
discriminating on the basis of mental retardation).
59 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 377-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (reviewing the legislative record
documenting discrimination against persons with disabilities, which included thirteen
congressional hearings and task force hearings in every state).
60 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
61 Id. at 442-47.
62 Id. at 458 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he Court's
heightened-scrutiny discussion is even more puzzling given that Cleburne's ordinance is
invalidated only after being subjected to precisely the sort of probing inquiry associated
with heightened scrutiny.").
63 See, e.g., Jane S. Schacter, Ely at the Altar: Political Process Theory Through the Lens
of the Marriage Debate, 109 MICH. L. REv. 1363, 1400 (2011) (describing Cleburne as
applying "muscular" rational basis review).
64 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366 n.4 ("Applying the basic principles of rationality review,
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The Court's resolution of the level of scrutiny problem paved the way for its
consideration of the implications of Congress's lengthy record of
discrimination against disabled workers. The Court reviewed that record
exceptionally strictly, in a way that reduced most of Congress's examples to
irrelevance. 65 Taken together, the Court's review amounted to an insistence
that the only relevant instances of discrimination were those committed by a
state (rather than private entities or even subunits of state government), 66
which, if challenged in court, would fail rational basis scrutiny. 67 Given these
criteria - in particular, the requirement that any relevant example reflect not
just irrational discrimination, but discrimination so irrational as to fail the
Court's own rational basis standard, complete with that standard's
progovernment presumptions 68 - it was unsurprising that the Court concluded
that Congress had failed to identify a pattern of relevant conduct justifying the
ADA's employment provisions as enforcement legislation. 69 Thus, as with
Kimel, the Garrett Court's analysis ultimately turned heavily on the suspect
class status of the benefitted group. Indeed, Garrett's insistence on reviewing
enforcement legislation according to the judicially created suspect class
template was so pronounced that prominent scholars began referring to the
Court's Enforcement Clause doctrine as "juricentric. ''70
Cleburne struck down the city ordinance in question.").
65 Id. at 369-72 (discounting congressional findings of discrimination against the
disabled because most of these findings only implicated private employers, and the findings
of state discrimination were only "unexamined, anecdotal accounts").
66 Id. at 369 (criticizing the congressional record supporting the ADA for its dearth of
"incidents" that "deal with activities of States"); id. at 368-69 (refusing to consider
examples of discrimination from sub-units of state governments).
67 Id. at 372 (holding that "even were it possible to squeeze out of these examples [of
discrimination against people with disabilities] a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination
by the States," the ADA would fail because "it would be entirely rational (and therefore
constitutional) for a state employer to conserve scarce financial resources by hiring
employees who are able to use existing facilities" instead of new facilities that
accommodate disabled employees).
68 See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1993) (setting forth
the evidentiary presumptions in favor of government action that is challenged as failing the
rational basis standard).
69 As in Kimel, the Garrett Court then considered whether the statute's scope sufficiently
cabined state liability for the law to be considered congruent and proportional to the
underlying constitutional violation. 531 U.S. at 372-74. Also as in Kimel, the Court found
the statute to be not sufficiently cabined. Id. ("[T]he rights and remedies created by the
ADA against the States... raise.., concerns as to congruence and proportionality .... ).
70 See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People:
Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 2 (2003); see also Eric
Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth Constitutional Decision Making, 98 IOWA L.
REv. 465, 474-76 (2013); Kevin S. Schwartz, Note, Applying Section 5: Tennessee v. Lane
and Judicial Conditions on the Congressional Enforcement Power, 114 YALE L.J. 1133,
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This practice continued in the next case, even though it produced the
opposite result. In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,7 1 the
Court upheld provisions of the FMLA allowing workers time off for the care of
ill family members. 72 The State defended the provisions as legislation
enforcing the equal protection right to sex equality.73 The Court agreed,
employing a markedly more lenient congruence and proportionality review
than that in either Kimel or Garrett. For example, the Court relied upon
private-sector data,74 accepted disparate impact results rather than insisting on
only results flowing from discriminatory intent, 75 and rejected the argument
that FMLA leave was unnecessary in light of state governments' decisions to
grant such leave as a matter of state law. 76 In a key passage, the Court
harmonized this more lenient review with its more stringent review in Kimel
and Garrett in a way that explicitly linked the fate of enforcement legislation
to the suspect class status of the benefitted group. The following passage can
be understood as summing up the first phase of the Court's application of the
congruence and proportionality standard to equal protection enforcement
legislation:
[T]he States' record of unconstitutional participation in, and fostering of,
gender-based discrimination in the administration of leave benefits is
weighty enough to justify the enactment of prophylactic § 5 legislation.
We reached the opposite conclusion in Garrett and Kimel. In those cases,
the § 5 legislation under review responded to a purported tendency of
state officials to make age- or disability-based distinctions. Under our
equal protection case law, discrimination on the basis of such
characteristics is not judged under a heightened review standard, and
passes muster if there is a rational basis for doing so ....
Here, however, Congress directed its attention to state gender
discrimination, which triggers a heightened level of scrutiny. Because the
standard for demonstrating the constitutionality of a gender-based
1134-35 (2005).
71 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
72 Id. at 740 (concluding that the FMLA provision is "congruent and proportional to its
remedial object, and can 'be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent,
unconstitutional behavior').
73 Id. at 730-32.
74 Id. at 730.
75 Id. at 749-50 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for relying on evidence
that "could perhaps support the charge of disparate impact, but not a charge that States have
engaged in a pattern of intentional discrimination prohibited by the Fourteenth
Amendment").
76 Id. at 732-33 (finding that FMLA is necessary regardless of such state law measures
because the FMLA is what motivated some states to act, and many others had yet to pass
such measures).
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classification is more difficult to meet than our rational-basis test ... it
was easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional
violations. 77
More recent cases have called into question the close connection between a
group's suspect class status and the deference enjoyed by enforcement
legislation. These more recent cases have thus introduced a potentially new
phase in the evolution of the congruence and proportionality standard. In 2012,
in Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland,78 the Court struck down a
different set of FMLA provisions, providing leave time for an employee to
attend to his own illnesses.79 Like the statute's family-care provisions, the
FMLA's self-care provisions were defended as legislation enforcing the equal
protection right to sex equality.80 Defenders argued that that the self-care
provisions helped mitigate the sex-skewed impact of the FMLA's family-care
provisions.81 They suggested that employers would likely view those latter
provisions as a benefit primarily utilized by women, who employers presume
to be primarily responsible for caring for ill family members. 82 This dynamic,
they suggested, would redound to women's detriment, as the FMLA would
ultimately be seen as making women less attractive as employees. The
defenders thus argued that the self-care provisions mitigated that effect by
providing a benefit that employees would use on a sex-neutral basis. 83
As legislation targeting sex discrimination, under the existing template the
self-care provisions would receive relatively lenient review. But they did not.
Breaking with that template, the plurality84 expressed skepticism about the
77 Id. at 735-36 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
78 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012).
79 Id. at 1338 (plurality opinion) (striking down the provisions because Congress failed to
"identify a pattern of constitutional violations and tailor a remedy congruent and
proportional to the documented violations").
80 Id. at 1334-35 (reviewing the petitioner's argument that "[t]he self-care provision...
addresses sex discrimination and sex stereotyping").
81 Id. at 1335-37 (reviewing and rejecting this argument).
82 Id. at 1335 ("Petitioner argues that employers may assume women are more likely to
take family-care leave than men and that the FMLA therefore offers up to 12 weeks of leave
for family care and self care combined.").
83 Id. ("According to petitioner, when the self-care provision is coupled with the family-
care provisions, the self-care provision could reduce the difference in the expected number
of weeks of FMLA leave that different employees take for different reasons."). Defenders of
the law also argued, separately, that the provision of self-care leave protected against
pregnancy discrimination. See id. (rejecting this argument).
84 Justice Kennedy wrote for himself, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and
Alito. Id at 1332. Justice Scalia concurred only in the judgment, continuing to register his
disagreement with the congruence and proportionality standard, which he had signed onto in
Boerne and subsequent cases, but which he abandoned in Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509,
557-58 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting), in favor of a much stricter rule prohibiting
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value of the self-care provisions in mitigating any sex-skewed impact flowing
from the FMLA's family-care provisions. 85 Indeed, the plurality even cited the
availability of self-care leave under state law as evidence of the lack of a
constitutional problem, thus arguably contradicting Hibbs's dismissal of
similar state provision of family-care leave. 86 Given this relatively stringent
review, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Coleman plurality never quoted
Hibbs's language about the easier evidentiary task Congress faced when
enacting enforcement legislation benefitting a group the Court had identified as
a suspect class.
It is possible to read Coleman as consistent with the Kimel-Garrett-Hibbs
template. As explained above, in Coleman the plurality simply did not believe
that the self-care provisions achieved any significant improvement in sex
equality.8 7 It is possible, perhaps, that Coleman has introduced a new,
preliminary, requirement that enforcement legislation be minimally effective
before it will be tested for congruence and proportionality. Under this reading,
before legislation like the self-care provisions can be tested under Hibbs's
more generous approach to judging congruence and proportionality, a court has
to be convinced that the legislation actually furthers the sex equality goal. To
be sure, Coleman did not explicitly impose such a hurdle. Nevertheless, such a
reading renders Coleman more consistent with earlier cases that did not
mention such a requirement, perhaps because the earlier statutes (the ADEA,
the ADA, and the FMLA's family-care provisions) clearly advanced the
prophylactic enforcement legislation except in the context of race discrimination, see
Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1338 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
85 Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1334-38.
86 The two situations may not be precisely alike. In Hibbs the majority acknowledged
that some states had provided family leave, but then went on to critique the
comprehensiveness of those benefits. See Hibbs v. Nev. Dep't of Human Res., 538 U.S.
721, 733-34 (2003) (reviewing the "shortcomings of some state policies," including state
measures that provide childcare leave only for women, thereby "reinforc[ing] the very
stereotypes that Congress sought to remedy through the FMLA"). Nevertheless, Hibbs's
first, and presumably primary, answer to the argument that state-granted family leave
rendered enforcement legislation on that topic unnecessary focused on the fact that states
did not begin considering such leave until federal leave legislation was introduced. See id. at
732-33. Taking this response seriously would suggest that Coleman also should have
engaged the chronology question when determining the significance of states' provision of
self-care leave. It did not. See Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1334-35.
87 See, e.g., Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1335-37 (rejecting the argument that the self care
provision furthered sex equality by serving as a necessary adjunct to the family care
provisions upheld in Hibbs); id. at 1335 ("Without widespread evidence of sex
discrimination or sex stereotyping in the administration of sick leave, it is apparent that the
congressional purpose in enacting the self care provision is unrelated to these supposed
wrongs."). But see id. at 1337-38 (acknowledging that most single parents are women, and
thus suggesting that the self-care provision may remedy employers' leave restrictions that
have a disparate impact on women).
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asserted goals, leaving as the only question whether they were too aggressive -
that is, not congruent and proportional - in achieving them. 88 Still, at least in
the absence of an explicit Court statement to this effect, an equally plausible
reading is that Coleman does mark some type of break with the Kimel-Garrett-
Hibbs template.
That template has continued to erode. In 2013, the year after Coleman, the
Court struck down the formula by which states were made subject to the
preclearance provisions of the VRA.89 The VRA was designed to protect the
voting rights of racial minorities, thus combining protections based on race
with the right to vote, which is one of the few rights subject to a presumptive
constitutional requirement of equal distribution.9" Thus, one would expect
judicial review of the VRA to be quite deferential. The Court in Shelby County
v. Holder, however, second guessed the preclearance provision's coverage
formula, concluding that Congress's failure to update that formula for several
decades rendered it irrational in light of improvements in minority voting
statistics in the covered jurisdictions.9'
Nevertheless, the impact of Shelby County on the Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement power is unclear. Most notably, the Court's statement of the
relevant standard of review is quite opaque. The VRA was enacted and
defended as legislation enforcing both the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth
Amendments. 92 In particular, the Court originally upheld the preclearance
provisions at issue in Shelby County as legislation enforcing the Fifteenth
Amendment. 93 The Court has never held that Boerne's congruence and
proportionality standard applies to legislation enforcing the Fifteenth
Amendment. In Shelby County, the Court's discussion of its standard of review
simply cited as controlling its earlier VRA case, Northwest Austin Municipal
Utility District Number One v. Holder, where the Court was presented with,
but avoided, the enforcement power question.94 Northwest Austin, however,
88 To state this requirement is not, of course, to express agreement either with it or how it
is applied. Cf id. at 1339 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority's analysis
of the self care provision).
89 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
90 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 576 (1964) (identifying the right to vote as one
that must presumptively be accorded equally); Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 860
(D.C. Cir. 2012), rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 2612.
91 Id. at 2630-31.
92 Id. at 2622 n. 1 (citing an earlier case presenting the constitutionality of the coverage
formula as raising issues under both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments (citing Nw.
Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009))); id. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) ("After a century's failure to fulfill the promise of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, passage of the VRA finally led to signal improvement of this front.").
93 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
94 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2615-16 (quoting the standard set forth in Northwest Austin
and declaring that "[t]hese basic principles guide review of the question presented here").
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explicitly refused to decide whether the congruence and proportionality test
applied to the VRA.95 Shelby County's description of the current coverage
formula as "irrational" 96 could thus either suggest application of the rationality
standard previously applied to legislation enforcing the Fifteenth
Amendment, 97 or a conclusion that the formula failed any standard that might
conceivably apply.
Leaving standard of review formulas aside, Shelby County's overall
message remains clear: even legislation aimed at protecting suspect classes and
fundamental rights may not receive deferential treatment in the future. In this
sense, Shelby County reinforces Coleman's suggestion that the template that
has framed application of the congruence and proportionality standard for over
a decade is now open to question.
B. The Breakdown of Suspect Class Doctrine
Coleman and, more speculatively, Shelby County suggest a possible change
in the Court's Enforcement Clause doctrine away from heavy reliance on the
suspect class status of the group benefitted by enforcement legislation. If
ultimately borne out, that evolution would be welcome news, given the gradual
but unmistakable erosion of the Court's suspect class jurisprudence.
If not already dead,98 suspect class analysis is in deep senescence. For at
least two decades, scholars have remarked on the Court's reluctance to create
new suspect classes based on political process analysis. 99 Two decades ago,
however, they could point to Cleburne as a relatively recent example of the
Court at least engaging in such analysis. From the current vantage point, what
is remarkable is not so much the Court's unwillingness to create new suspect
classes but its unwillingness even to consider that possibility. Cleburne,
decided almost thirty years ago, marks the last time the Court engaged in a
serious suspect class analysis.
This abandonment of political process-based suspect-class analysis is not for
lack of opportunities to use it. In 1989, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co.,l°° the Court faced a credible argument that race-based affirmative action
set-asides merited something less than strict scrutiny because those plans
95 See Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 204 ("That question [dealing with the standard of review]
has been extensively briefed in this case, but we need not resolve it. The Act's preclearance
requirements and its coverage formula raise serious constitutional questions under either
test.").
96 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2630-31.
97 See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326-27 (announcing the rationality standard in this
context).
98 See GERSTMANN, supra note 28.
99 See, e.g., Mark Strasser, Suspect Classes and Suspect Classifications: On
Discrimination, Unwittingly or Otherwise, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 937, 947 & n.63 (1991); Kenji
Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REv. 747, 748 (2011).
100 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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reflected the white majority's decision to burden itself for the benefit of a
minority group. 0 1 Yet the Court began its discussion of the scrutiny level, not
with political process analysis, but rather with a discussion of the substantive
evils of government race consciousness.1 02 When it did get to the political
process argument - an argument the Court's phraseology suggested stood in
logical tension with the Court's earlier identification of those harms10 3 - the
Court provided a formalistic, halfhearted, and unconvincing application of
political process reasoning to justify heightened scrutiny of the particular plan
at issue in JA. Croson.104 To be sure, the Court continues to apply heightened
scrutiny in race cases, and appears to take seriously the question of the scrutiny
level. Indeed, two days before deciding Windsor, the Court vacated an
appellate court decision reviewing a university's race-based affirmative action
plan, on the ground that the lower court had misapplied the strict scrutiny
standard. 05 The Court, however, reaffirmed its commitment to a substantive,
rather than a process-based understanding as to why racial classifications
merited such heightened review. 106
101 See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union et al., J.A.
Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (No. 87-998), 1987 WL 880105, at *9-21 (using political process
reasoning to argue for a less-than-strict level of judicial review of affirmative action plans
designed to assist politically powerless minorities); John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of
Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 723, 735 (1974) ("When the group that
controls the decision making process classifies so as to advantage a minority and
disadvantage itself, the reasons for being unusually suspicious, and, consequently,
employing a stringent standard of review, are lacking.").
102 J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 ("Classifications based on race carry a danger of
stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact
promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility.").
103 See id. at 495 ("Even were we to accept a reading of the guarantee of equal protection
under which the level of scrutiny varies according to the ability of different groups to defend
their interests in the representative process, heightened scrutiny would still be appropriate in
the circumstances of this case." (emphasis added)).
104 See id. at 495-96 (observing that blacks occupied five of the nine seats on the
Richmond City Council when the set-aside plan was adopted).
10 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013).
116 See id. at 2418 (describing race classifications as "odious to a free people," "contrary
to our traditions," and "seldom ... a relevant basis for disparate treatment" (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted)); Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern
Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REv. 213, 308-09 (1991) ("For the first time the Justices have
been forced to choose between a political process theory, which identifies suspect
classifications according to criteria of historical discrimination and political impotence, and
a more openly normative theory of 'relevance,' which banishes certain criteria from
governmental decisionmaking on the ground that they should be irrelevant. . . . [T]he
Court's recent affirmative action jurisprudence demonstrates . . . a clear choice for the
relevance approach ... ").
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Four years after JA. Croson, the Court had an opportunity to revisit
Cleburne's suspect class analysis. In Heller v. Doe,107 the Court considered an
equal protection challenge to a state's procedure for civil confinement of the
mentally ill.1°8 Justice Kennedy, on behalf of the Court, upheld the state
procedures as satisfying the rational basis standard. 109 Justice Kennedy
observed the plaintiffs' argument in favor of applying heightened scrutiny, but
refused to address it, on the ground that it had not been raised in the lower
courts. 110 In deciding to apply the rational basis standard, Justice Kennedy
cited Cleburne as an example of the Court having applied that level of scrutiny
to mental retardation classifications.11' In a manner previewing its analysis in
Garrett,' 12 however, the Heller majority implied that Cleburne-style rationality
review did not differ from the traditional, highly deferential scrutiny normally
associated with the rational basis standard. 113 In other words, when presented
with an opportunity to address whether Cleburne had enshrined a de facto
heightened-scrutiny standard, and the level of scrutiny issue more generally,
the Court demurred on both questions.
In turn, three years after Heller, the Court in United States v. Virginia'14
confronted political process-based arguments both for and against raising the
level of scrutiny accorded sex classifications.1 15 Those arguments largely
107 509 U.S. 312 (1993).
108 Id. at 315 ("At issue here are elements of Kentucky's statutory procedures, enacted in
1990, for the involuntary confinement of the mentally retarded.").
109 Id. at 333 ("[T]here are plausible rationales for each of the statutory distinctions
challenged by respondents in this case.").
110 See id at 318-19 ("This claim is not properly presented. Respondents argued before
the District Court and the Court of Appeals only that Kentucky's statutory scheme was
subject to rational-basis review, and the courts below ruled on that ground."). Justice
Blackmun dissented, restating his view from Cleburne that mental retardation
discrimination should trigger heightened scrutiny. See id at 334-35 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Justice Souter's dissent agreed with the majority's decision not to reach the
suspect class question. Id. at 336 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter would have struck
down the challenged law on the authority of Cleburne, however, which he described in ways
suggesting that that case applied something more stringent than traditional rational basis
review. See id. at 335.
111 See id at 321 (majority opinion) (citing Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432, and Schweiker v.
Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981)). But see id. at 335 (Souter, J., dissenting) (suggesting that
Cleburne had applied something more than traditional, highly deferential, rational basis
review).
112 See supra note 64 and accompanying text (describing the Garrett Court's assertion
that Cleburne's standard of review was nothing more than traditional rational basis review).
113 See Heller, 509 U.S. at 321 ("In neither [Cleburne nor Schweiker] did we purport to
apply a different standard of rational-basis review from that just described." (citing
Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432 (1985))).
114 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
"5 See Brief for the Petitioner, Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (No. 94-1941), 1995 LEXIS 583,
2014]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
followed the template established by the Court's earlier suspect class
jurisprudence, engaging issues such as the history of discrimination against
women, 116 the immutability of the sex characteristic, 1 7 and the current
political status of women.' 8 The Court, however, did not directly respond to
those arguments or the dissent's suggestion that political process analysis
should have led the Court to reduce the level of scrutiny accorded sex
classifications' 19 Justice Ginsburg, writing for six justices, observed as a
historical matter the political process reasoning underlying the Court's seminal
case arguing that sex discrimination merited heightened scrutiny. 120 She did
not, however, employ that reasoning to reengage the standard of review
question. Instead, she purported to follow existing precedent - in particular,
case law requiring that sex classifications be supported by an "exceedingly
at *48-54 (arguing that sex should be raised to full suspect class status); Brief of Amici
Curiae Independent Women's Forum et al. in Support of Respondents, Virginia, 518 U.S.
515 (No 94-1941), 1995 LEXIS 645, at *12-22 [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae] (urging
against such a ratcheting up).
116 Compare Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 115, at *51 ("Respondents here seek to
perpetuate a sex-based exclusion that dates from a time when women could neither vote nor
'hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own names and married women
traditionally were denied the legal capacity to hold or convey property or to serve as legal
guardians of their own children."' (citation omitted)), with Brief of Amici Curiae, supra
note 115, at *11 (acknowledging the argument based on this history of discrimination
against women, but arguing against an increase in the scrutiny level accorded sex
classifications).
117 Compare Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 115, at *50 ("[S]ex, like race, is an
immutable and highly visible characteristic .... ), with Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note
115, at * 14 ("Despite the fact that mental retardation is an immutable characteristic, beyond
the individual's control ... the Court [in Cleburne] would not upgrade the level of scrutiny
applied to this type of legislative classification.").
118 Compare Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 115, at *52 ("Despite the fact that
women are a numerical majority in the United States, women remain vastly politically
underrepresented in state and federal government- The relative political powerlessness also
demonstrates the need for searching judicial analysis when government treats men and
women differently."), with Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 115, at * 18 ("Women already
have the political power to elect women to represent them; indeed if all women voted the
same and chose to elect only women, virtually every elected office in the United States
could be filled by a woman."), and id. at *19-21 (providing statistics suggesting women's
equality in the marketplace).
119 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 566, 575 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Carolene Products and
suggesting that application of standard suspect class criteria would result in sex
classifications receiving only rational basis review (citing United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938))).
120 See id at 531 ("Today's skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights or
opportunities based on sex responds to volumes of history. As a plurality of this Court
acknowledged a generation ago, 'our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex
discrimination."' (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973))).
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persuasive justification"'1' - while quite arguably ratcheting up that scrutiny to
the point where it was, as a practical matter, the equivalent of strict scrutiny.' 22
The Court's refusal to engage with suspect class analysis continued with the
trio of gay rights cases decided by the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. In Romer
v. Evans,123 decided in the same term as United States v. Virginia, the Court
applied a combination of novel equal protection analysis and seemingly
heightened rational basis scrutiny to strike down a Colorado constitutional
amendment denying gays and lesbians protected class status under state law. 124
The Court's analysis - finding the law both to constitute a per se violation of
equal protection and to violate standard rational basis review - is well known,
if controversial, among both judges 125 and scholars. 126 For our purposes, the
important point is that the Court failed even to consider the suspect class status
of gays and lesbians, an issue that had been presented to the Court since at
least the mid- 1980s. 127
This evasion continued into the new century. In Lawrence v. Texas, a six-
Justice majority struck down Texas's sodomy law. 128 One member of that
majority, however, did not join the five Justices voting to invalidate the law as
121 Id. (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
122 See id. at 542 (implying that as long as one woman could succeed at and benefit from
VMI's unique pedagogical approach the state's exclusion of women failed equal protection
scrutiny). Any such ratcheting up was soon called into question by the Court's application
of markedly more deferential review in its next major sex discrimination case. Nguyen v.
INS, 533 U.S. 53, 74 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority had
applied mistakenly deferential review in contradiction to the Court's sex discrimination
precedents).
123 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
124 See id at 632 ("[T]he amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and
undifferentiated disability on a single named group, an exceptional and, as we shall explain,
invalid form of legislation.").
125 See, e.g., id at 653 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Today's opinion has no foundation in
American constitutional law, and barely pretends to.").
126 For evaluations of the Court's analysis in Romer, see Robert D. Dodson, Homosexual
Discrimination and Gender: Was Romer v. Evans Really a Victory for Gay Rights?, 35
CAL. W. L. REV. 271 (1999); Katherine M. Hamill, Romer v. Evans: Dulling the Equal
Protection Gloss on Bowers v. Hardwick, 77 B.U. L. REV. 655 (1997); Mark Strasser,
Same-Sex Marriage Referenda and the Constitution: On Hunter, Romer, and Electoral
Process Guarantees, 64 ALB. L. REV. 949 (2001); Mark Strasser, Statutory Construction,
Equal Protection, and the Amendment Process: On Romer, Hunter, and Efforts to Tame
Baehr, 45 Burr. L. REV. 739 (1997).
127 See, e.g., Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1009 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); see also Pruitt v. Cheney, 506 U.S. 1020,
1020 (1992) (denying certiorari in a case where the appellate court had required the Army to
present evidence validating the rationality of a policy excluding gays and lesbians, and thus
engaging in a more active form of rational basis review).
128 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003).
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a violation of the Due Process Clause. Instead, noting that the Texas law
applied only to same-sex sodomy, Justice O'Connor relied on the Equal
Protection Clause to condemn the law as unconstitutional sexual orientation
discrimination. In her opinion, Justice O'Connor suggested that sexual
orientation classifications merited heightened scrutiny. Citing the Moreno-
Cleburne-Romer trio of rational basis plus cases, she concluded that "[w]hen a
law exhibits .. .a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have
applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike down such
laws under the Equal Protection Clause."'1 29
Justice O'Connor's recognition that rational basis review can occur in a
more heightened register provided part of the backdrop of doctrinal options the
Court faced in its final gay rights decision to date, Windsor.130 The majority in
Windsor had before it the precedent of a concurring (although not decisive) 13 1
opinion explicitly acknowledging and applying a heightened level of scrutiny
for sexual orientation discrimination. As the Court approached Windsor it also
had before it the option of replaying the progression of its sex equality
jurisprudence a generation earlier. The modem era of the Court's sex equality
jurisprudence began with the Court's 1971 decision in Reed v. Reed, striking
down, for the first time, a sex classification as violating equal protection. 132
The Reed Court concluded that the state law, which instituted a preference for
male over female relatives as estate administrators, failed traditional rational
basis review. 133 That conclusion was perhaps unconvincing; the Idaho law may
have been unfair, but given the likely educational differences between men and
women in that era the classification cannot be deemed so irrational as to fail
traditional rational basis review. Two years later, when Justice Brennan cited
129 Id. at 580 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
130 This Article does not classify as "gay rights" decisions, such as Windsor's
companion, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013), that are decided on
jurisdictional grounds, or others, such as Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640
(2000), and Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515
U.S. 557 (1995), that, while involving gay rights litigants and claims, are decided on
grounds at least ostensibly tangential to due process claims to same-sex intimacy or equal
protection claims against sexual orientation discrimination.
131 Justice Kennedy's due process opinion in Lawrence spoke for a majority of Justices,
thereby rendering Justice O'Connor's vote and rationale unnecessary to the resolution of the
case. Cf Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 197 (1977) (explaining the role of a
concurring opinion's analysis when the concurring Justice is necessary to the formation of a
court majority).
132 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
133 Id ("The question presented by this case, then, is whether a difference in the sex of
competing applicants for letters of administration bears a rational relationship to a state
objective .... We hold that it does not.").
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Reed as support for his argument for heightened scrutiny of sex classifications,
he made exactly this point.
134
Mapping this progression onto sexual orientation classifications, it seemed
to many post-Romer observers that Romer would end up playing a similar role
as Reed: a case that ostensibly applied rational basis review to strike down
discrimination, but that would eventually come to be described as an example
of sub silentio heightened scrutiny in a subsequent case that made that
heightened scrutiny explicit.' 35 Such expectations may have been further raised
when Justice O'Connor in Lawrence cited Romer as an example of just such
heightened scrutiny. 136 Thus, as the Court approached Windsor the stage was
set for the last act in the drama, where the Court would bestow heightened
scrutiny on sexual orientation, explaining that that decision simply brought into
the open what had been implicit since Romer. As if on cue, the plaintiff in
Windsor - and extraordinarily, the government defendant as well - argued that
sexual orientation should be a suspect class, 13 7 a position also taken by the
lower court. 138
But the Court again demurred, and refused to consider whether sexual
orientation constituted a suspect class. Instead, Justice Kennedy's analysis in
Windsor combined concepts of due process, equality, and federalism to render
a much more direct verdict on the constitutionality of section 3 of DOMA.
After observing states' traditional role in regulating marriage and the federal
government's general practice of respecting state marriage decisions, 39 he
explained that a state's decision to grant a particular group the right to marry
134 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683-84 (1973) (plurality opinion) ("[Tihe
Court [in Reed] implicitly rejected appellee's apparently rational explanation of the statutory
scheme .... This departure from 'traditional' rational-basis analysis with respect to sex-
based classifications is clearly justified.").
135 See, e.g., Edward Stein, Introducing Lawrence v. Texas: Some Background and a
Glimpse of the Future, 10 CARDOzo WOMEN's L.J. 263, 270 (2004) (illustrating these
predictions).
136 See id. at 282-83 (highlighting Justice O'Connor's Lawrence concurrence in this
way).
137 See Brief for the Petitioner at 18-37, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)
(No. 12-307) ("[C]lassifications based sexual orientation should be subject to heightened
scrutiny."); Brief for Respondent at 17-32, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307) ("Over
the years, the Court has applied heightened scrutiny to classifications based on race, sex,
illegitimacy, alienage, and national origin or ancestry. . . . Discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation - which DOMA surely constitutes - requires heightened scrutiny."); see
also Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683 (discussing the Justice Department's letter to Congress
informing it of its opinion that sexual orientation discrimination merits heightened judicial
scrutiny).
138 See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181 (2d Cir. 2012), aff'd, 133 S. Ct.
2675 (2013).
139 See 133 S. Ct. at 2689-92 ("[T]he Federal Government, through our history, has
deferred to state-law policy decisions with respect to domestic relations." Id. at 2191.).
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"conferred upon [members of that group] a dignity and status of immense
import." 140 While recognizing that Congress has occasionally enacted
"discrete"1 41 statutes prescribing who could take advantage of the status of
"married" for particular federal purposes, he cautioned that section 3's broad
applicability to over 1000 federal rights and responsibilities accessible to
married persons raised the possibility that section 3 was aimed simply at
"demeaning" persons in same-sex relationships.1 42 Upon investigating section
3's text and legislative materials, Justice Kennedy concluded that section 3 had
precisely this invidious motivation and was thus unconstitutional. 143 Notably,
he reached this conclusion without considering whether sexual orientation
constituted a suspect basis for classification and without even identifying a
standard of review. Indeed, he reached this result without examining whether
the statute had even a rational connection to a legitimate govemment interest.
Much of this analysis echoes Justice Kennedy's earlier decision in Romer -
most notably his avoidance of the suspect class question and his focus on the
challenged legislation's broad impact. 144 Yet in important ways, Windsor goes
even further than Romer in abandoning traditional equal protection review. As
observed above, unlike in Romer, Justice Kennedy in Windsor did not even
perform the standard task of testing the statute for a rational connection to the
proffered legitimate govemment interests.1 45 Instead, to a degree much more
direct than even in Romer, in Windsor he cut to the core of the equal protection
guarantee, finding direct evidence of animus in DOMA's legislative
materials.146
So understood, Windsor is doubly significant for the future of suspect-class
analysis. First, it reflects yet another foregone opportunity for the Court to
140 Id. at 2692.
141 See id at 2690 ("Though these discrete examples establish the constitutionality of
limited federal laws that regulate the meaning of marriage in order to further federal policy,
DOMA has far greater reach .... ).
142 See id. at 2694 ("This places same-sex couples in an unstable position of being in a
second-tier marriage. The differentiation demeans the couple, whose moral and sexual
choices the Constitution protects .... ").
141 See id. at 2695 ("[The investigation of these factors] requires the Court to hold, as it
now does, that DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty of the person
protected by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.").
144 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1995) (discussing the implications of the breadth
of Colorado's Amendment 2).
141 Id. at 635 (testing Amendment 2's fit against the rationales proffered by the state
government of Colorado). But see Young & Blondel, supra note 3, at 137-42 (suggesting
that the Court at least implicitly took some account of at least some justifications for section
3 in Windsor).
146 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 ("The history of DOMA's enactment and its own text
demonstrate that interference with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages . . . was more
than an incidental effect of the federal statute. It was its essence.").
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apply suspect class analysis - or even to acknowledge the possibility that
sexual orientation could be a suspect class. 147 That avoidance also shattered the
Reed-Frontiero template, in which an early case decided on minimalist rational
basis grounds ultimately provided support for a broader decision granting that
group heightened scrutiny. 148 Second, Windsor's confident conclusion 149 that
section 3 reflected nothing but animus suggests an alternative approach to
equal protection, one that abjures reliance on the indirect mediating principles
implicit in suspect-class analysis (and even in traditional "fit" analysis) in
favor of a more direct examination of a challenged law's constitutionality.
Suspect class analysis finds its antecedents in Carolene Products's suggestion
in footnote 4 that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities" may be "a
special condition" meriting heightened judicial scrutiny due to a breakdown in
the political process. 150 By suggesting that political process breakdown
provides the justification for heightened scrutiny, footnote 4 - and ultimately,
its doctrinal expression in suspect class analysis and the tiered scrutiny
structure - reveals its foundations as a methodology that allows courts to infer
indirectly the existence of constitutional problems.' 51 By abandoning that
approach in favor of a direct inquiry into whether a statute reflects government
pursuit of private biases, Windsor, perhaps even more than Romer, signals a
potentially decisive break with much of the Court's traditional equal protection
jurisprudence.
"I Compare Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (striking down section 3 of DOMA without
deciding whether sexual orientation is a suspect class or even acknowledging that possibility
beyond noting the executive branch's and the lower court's positions on the issue), with
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (acknowledging the argument that the mentally
retarded or the mentally ill might constitute a suspect class, but declining to reach the merits
of that argument because the plaintiffs had not presented it before the lower courts), and
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (recognizing an argument
that a racial majority's decision to burden itself for the benefit of a minority might justify a
lesser scrutiny standard for race-based affirmative action targeting the politically weaker
group for benefits, but rejecting it as inapplicable in the immediate case).
148 Of course, this still might happen in the future in the context of sexual orientation.
But the second reason Windsor is so significant, explained in the text immediately after this
footnote, casts doubt on this possibility.
149 See generally Jennifer Mason McAward, The Confident Court, 47 Loy. L.A. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2014) (arguing that the current Court exhibits unusual confidence in reviewing
the judgments of other institutions).
1 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
1 See id.; supra note 6 and accompanying text (quoting Justice Alito as suggesting this
understanding of the suspect class/tiered scrutiny structure of equal protection law).
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II. THE ENFORCEMENT POWER AND THE PERILS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
POINTILLISM
A. The Coming Conflict
Windsor's potentially conclusive rejection of suspect class analysis raises
serious questions about the future of Enforcement Clause doctrine. As Part I
explains, 152 the post-Boerne Enforcement Clause doctrine has relied heavily on
the suspect class status of the group benefitted by the challenged legislation.
While Coleman and Shelby County suggest some erosion of that approach, the
approach is sufficiently ingrained that the disconnect between it and the
Court's general abandonment of suspect class analysis culminating in Windsor,
presents cause for concem. 153
This disconnect will have serious consequences as Congress continues to
respond to the equality claims of non-suspect classes. The remarkable shift in
public and congressional perceptions about same-sex marriage has quite
possibly changed the political dynamic for the ENDA, making its enactment
more likely. The ENDA's backers may even succeed in including employment
protection for transgendered workers, a step that in the past has proved fatal to
the bill's prospects. In ways not possible before the recent shift of opinion on
marriage rights, it is also possible to envisage other sexual orientation equality
legislation, such as public accommodations protection and even potentially
federal protections against discriminatory state parentage and adoption laws.
Moreover, equality legislation benefitting other emerging groups already
exists. The GINA, which restricts discrimination based on one's genetic
makeup, is already law. 154 Other groups, such as the obese, are beginning to
press their equality claims, and have already achieved some measure of
success. 155
Sexual orientation, transgendered status, genetic makeup, obesity: these
highly disparate classification tools share the characteristics that they either are
or may soon be the subject of federal Enforcement Clause legislation, have
never had their suspect class status determined by the Court, and likely never
will. If, and when, enforcement power challenges to these statutes reach the
Court, the Court will have to review its own recent equal protection
jurisprudence in order to determine whether the challenged statutes satisfy the
congruence and proportionality test. As it currently stands, that jurisprudence -
152 See supra Part I.A.
153 Indeed, as explained previously, it is possible to read Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.
Ct. 2612 (2013), and potentially Coleman v. Court of Appeals, 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012), as
consistent with the Court's prior Enforcement Clause jurisprudence. See supra Part I.
154 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat.
881 (codified in scattered sections of 29 & 42 U.S.C.).
155 See generally Liu, supra note 25 (considering whether the 2008 amendments to the
Americans with Disabilities Act provide protection for obese persons).
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at least as it deals with groups whose suspect class status has not been
determined - takes the form of a particularized, ad hoc investigation into the
legislation's public purpose. The next Section considers the enforcement
power implications of that style of equal protection scrutiny.
B. One Without the Other: The Enforcement Power in a World of
Constitutional Pointillism
One way to think about the enforcement power is to envision two concentric
circles. The outer circle represents the set of liability and remedy rules enacted
in the enforcement statute. The inner circle depicts the seriousness of the
constitutional problem that the statute targets. The size of the inner circle may
vary according to the regard the Court gives Congress's ability, through its
legislative work product, to expand that circle through conclusions that the
constitutional problem targeted is either more serious than the Court had
perceived or unusually resistant to remedial action.15 6 The distance between
those two circles determines the statute's congruence and proportionality.
While crude, this visualization captures the basic insight that the congruence
and proportionality standard, at base, requires some reasonable relationship -
literally, some congruence and proportionality - between the right protected
and the means employed to protect it.
The viability of this approach, however, depends on the inner circle being
susceptible to a coherent representation. The type of particularized
constitutional analysis performed in Windsor makes it difficult to reduce to a
diagram the scope of a Fourteenth Amendment right that Congress might seek
to enforce via legislation. This is not necessarily a criticism of Justice
Kennedy's analysis. The Court in Windsor, just like the Court in Romer and
Cleburne,157 cut through the mediating principles of suspect class and tiered
scrutiny analyses to decide, as a matter of core constitutional law, that the
classifications in those cases violated equal protection's fundamental
requirement that government action pursue a legitimate public purpose.158
156 See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 90-91 (2000) ("[It is sufficient
for [the Court's determination that the ADEA was unconstitutional] to note that Congress
failed to identify a widespread pattern of age discrimination by the States." (citing Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 640
(1999))).
157 See Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (striking down a federal
provision prohibiting unrelated persons living together, and cautioning that "a bare...
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate government
interest" (emphasis omitted)). This language became the foundation for the Court's later
decisions finding challenged government actions to have been infected with animus. See
infra note 180 (examining the influence of Moreno's language on other Equal Protection
Clause cases).
158 See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, Reasoning About the Irrational: The Roberts Court and
the Future of Constitutional Law, 86 WASH. L. REv. 217, 275 (2011) ("The baseline of the
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There is much to applaud in calling something what it really is - in these cases,
mean-spirited attempts to burden a group for reasons that amount to simple
dislike - even if, by and large, a court should show some humility when
accusing a legislature (especially the federal legislature) of acting out of such
motives. 15 9 Indeed, the difficulty the Court had encountered in leveling such
direct verdicts on legislative action is partly what led it to abandon its pre-1937
"class legislation" approach to constitutional rights, which sought to
distinguish between valid legislation that pursued legitimate police power
goals and invalid "class legislation" that impaired rights or discriminated
against groups for no legitimate reason.' 60 The Court's abandonment of that
approach led it to embrace in its place a methodology that focused on both
textually precise rights, which make judicial review more legitimate, as well as
on legislation that either directly impairs political participation or harms
politically powerless minorities, which provides a warning signal that the
legislation did not fairly account for all groups' interests.1 61 But that latter,
indirect approach to constitutional adjudication is exactly that - indirect.
Windsor, by abjuring such indirect constitutional jurisprudence, cuts to the
core of what equal protection requires.
Nevertheless, as normatively attractive as it may be, such direct
constitutional analysis complicates the Court's Enforcement Clause case law.
Decisions such as Windsor are particularized, focusing precisely and uniquely
on the idiosyncrasies of the challenged statute. 162 To analogize this approach to
art, such decisions are pointillist, rather than reflective of broad doctrinal
American constitutional order is a government that acts rationally, but not merely in the
sense that it has reasons for what it does; rationality in traditional thought has also meant
that government's actions are undertaken in good faith and for reasons that are generally
seen to be appropriate.").
"I Cf W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637-38 (1943) (suggesting that
local authorities may be more prone than Congress to fail to respect constitutional rights).
160 For a full explanation of this concept and its application in constitutional law during
the Lochner era, see HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITON BESIEGED: THE RISE AND
DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993).
161 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (reserving
heightened scrutiny for legislation that either appears to transgress one of the rights in the
Bill of Rights or that appears to either restrict political participation rights or reflect
prejudice against minorities that enjoy less access to the political process); see also S.C.
State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2 (1938) (reserving heightened
scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause for state statutes that disproportionately
burden entities or interests not represented within the state's legislative process).
162 For example, the Court's analysis in Windsor relied heavily on section 3's history,
and even the name of the statute. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693-94
(2013) ("The history of DOMA's enactment and its own text demonstrate that interference
with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages, a dignity conferred by the States in the
exercise of their sovereign power, was more than an incidental effect of the federal
statute.").
[Vol. 94:367
AFTER THE TIERS
brushstrokes. 163 By directly reviewing the challenged law for animus, such
decisions cut to the core of what equal protection requires, rather than applying
a broadly applicable level of heightened scrutiny. But such analysis remains,
by definition, highly particularized. As Chief Justice Roberts recognized in
Windsor itself, a conclusion that a legislature has acted with animus when
enacting a particular statute does not reflect a broader conclusion about the
general inappropriateness of that type of classification. It says little even about
the likelihood that other statutes classifying on that same ground and on that
same topic are similarly motivated. 164
Of course, as a realistic matter, a finding of animus in a series of cases could
lead a court to become more suspicious of a legislature's motivations whenever
it classifies on that ground. But acting on that suspicion would, almost literally,
amount to declaring the group suspect or quasi suspect. In the absence of such
a declaration, a finding of animus in one case of sexual orientation
discrimination would, at least formally, say little about the likely
constitutionality of a different instance of discrimination against gays and
lesbians.' 65 Indeed, in both Windsor and Romer, Justice Kennedy buttressed
the particularity of his animus conclusions by relying heavily on what he
described as the highly unusual breadth of both DOMA and Amendment 2, as
well as what he described as DOMA's unusual deviation from the federal law
practice of respecting state definitions of marriage.
The result is that it is difficult to apply the congruence and proportionality
test to a statute protecting a group that may have won equal protection
victories, but only on such particularistic grounds. Unless one is going to sub
silentio treat that group as a suspect class on the theory that several instances
of legislative animus suggest a constitutional rule generally disfavoring such
discrimination, the most one can do when considering an enforcement statute
protecting that group is to ask whether the particular type of discrimination
targeted by the enforcement statute is likely grounded in animus. To illustrate
this point, consider the ENDA.166 Given Romer and Windsor, at this stage of
doctrinal development, a court considering the ENDA as enforcement
legislation would presumably have to ask whether employment discrimination
against gays and lesbians 167 is, as a general matter, motivated by animus.168
163 See Courthion, supra note 36 (explaining that Pointillism is a "technique for
portraying the play of light using tiny brushstrokes of contrasting colors").
'6 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2697 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority focuses
on the legislative history and title of this particular Act; those statute specific considerations
will, of course, be irrelevant in future cases about different statutes." (citation omitted)).
165 See, e.g., id.
166 Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. (2013).
167 To simplify the analysis, this example leaves out consideration of the ENDA's
transgender protections.
168 Of course, it is possible that such discrimination is merely "innocently irrational" -
that is, lacking in any rational connection to a legitimate government interest, but
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That constitutional harm - government action motivated by animus - is the
only content of the "inner circle" against which the ENDA could be tested for
congruence and proportionality, 169 given the lack of any judicial doctrine
identifying sexual orientation as a generally suspect classification tool.
Such an inquiry might be conceptually difficult. As stated previously, it
would require, as a condition of upholding the ENDA, a conclusion that sexual
orientation employment discrimination is, as a general matter, based on
animus. Such a conclusion would amount to a step beyond the conclusions in
Romer and Windsor that the particular statutes in question were motivated by
animus. 17 0 Moreover, the more generalized animus conclusion the Court would
have to reach in order to uphold the ENDA seems, as a logical matter, more
difficult for the Court to defend in light of Garrett's insistence on a strong
evidentiary record supporting enforcement legislation benefitting a non-suspect
class. 171 Recall that Garrett insisted that such legislation be supported by a
record of discrimination that, if litigated, would have been struck down as
failing the rational basis test.' 72 Applied to the ENDA, this requirement would
nevertheless "innocent" of any subjective bad intent. Such "innocent irrationality" is a
conceptually troublesome concept, in light of its implied conclusion of utter government
incompetence. It would be especially troublesome if this idea were transplanted from the
context of direct equal protection review, where it is at least possible to conceptualize a
particular government action as innocent of animus but nevertheless utterly irrational, see,
e.g., Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cnty. Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336, 345-46 (1989) (finding
a state tax assessor's decision unconstitutionally irrational without hinting that it was
motivated by animus), to the very different context of enforcement legislation review, where
it would entail a court concluding that an entire species of government action (here, sexual
orientation employment discrimination) was similarly innocent but nevertheless utterly
irrational. If an entire type of government conduct, for example, sexual orientation
employment discrimination, is to be condemned as failing the rational basis test, it must be
because of a conclusion about animus, rather than "pure" irrationality.
169 See supra Part II.B (describing the "inner and outer circle" approach to applying the
congruence and proportionality analysis as well as discussing the difficulty of applying this
approach given Windsor).
170 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (holding DOMA unconstitutional given its violation
of the basic equal protection principle that no law be "motivated by an improper animus");
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) ("[Amendment 2] seems inexplicable by
anything but animus toward the class it affects .... ").
171 See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368-74 (2001) (finding
that the ADA's legislative record "fail[ed] to show that Congress did in fact identify a
pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against the disabled").
172 Id. at 368 (finding the ADA's legislative record failed to establish a pattern of state
discrimination that would be held unconstitutional under rational basis review). Of course,
Amendment 2 and DOMA would stand as examples of sexual orientation discrimination
struck down as animus-motivated legislation. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693; Romer, 517
U.S. at 632. But whether those state actions, related to topics other than employment
discrimination, would satisfy a conscientious application of the Garrett standard, remains an
open question, even if one adds to that list the scattering of lower court cases striking down
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require the compilation of a record of sexual orientation employment
discrimination that not only lacked any rational basis, but also was mean
spirited. Of course, the Court could simply assert that any such discrimination
exhibits animus. But such a holding would, yet again, go a long way toward
declaring sexual orientation a suspect class. It would not go all the way: At
least ostensibly, the holding would be limited to employment, leaving it
possible, for example, for states to continue engaging in sexual orientation
discrimination in other areas of life, such as parenting and marriage.
Nevertheless, that holding would both reflect a step beyond Romer and
Windsor and push hard against the Court's refusal to identify sexual orientation
as a generally suspect class.
III. A WAY FORWARD
A. The Problem, Summarized
Part II describes a paradoxical legal landscape. First, the record reveals two
equal protection victories for gay rights advocates where the Court found the
sexual orientation discrimination to be motivated by animus.173 Those cases are
notable for their failure even to acknowledge the possibility of an inquiry into
the suspect classification status of sexual orientation. Windsor, the more recent
of these cases, suggests an abandonment of traditional equal protection "fit"
review, 7 4 in favor of a direct but ad hoc inquiry into whether a government
action fails equal protection's fundamental requirement of public purpose
motivation. 175 Second, and in tension with this first development, enforcement
power doctrine as it currently stands still relies heavily on generalized suspect
class determinations. Coleman may point to a different direction on this issue,
sexual orientation discrimination as based on unconstitutional animus. See Araiza, New
Groups, supra note 34, at 472 n.122 (citing Circuit Court decisions striking down states
discrimination against gay individuals).
171 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693; Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. This number rises to three if
one counts Justice O'Connor's separate opinion in Lawrence. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The Texas sodomy law 'raise[s] the
inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of
persons affected."' (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 634)).
174 Cf Romer, 517 U.S. at 632-33 (discussing the centrality of "fit" review to equal
protection doctrine); William D. Araiza, Irrationality and Animus in Class-of-One Equal
Protection Cases, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 493, 505-06 (2007) (same).
171 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (inquiring into "whether a law is motivated by an
improper animus or purpose" to ensure that it does not run afoul of the Constitution's
minimum guarantee "'that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot' justify disparate treatment of that group" (quoting Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973))).
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but for now the different analysis in it and Shelby County remains too tentative
to be confident that the Court has embraced a new approach. 176
As Part II explains, these two components of the Court's current
enforcement power inquiry combine to create a situation where the Court has
recognized the constitutional flaws in a particular type of discrimination, but
has done so utilizing an approach that undermines Congress's power to
legislate against that same problem. This irony is compounded when one
realizes that the Court's gay rights equal protection decisions - especially
Windsor - reflect an aggressive probing of legislative action. 177 Thus, the
paradox: The very aggressiveness of the Court's approach to the underlying
equal protection question appears to exclude congressional participation in the
same antidiscrimination project.
The possible enactment of ENDA and other gay rights-protective
enforcement legislation will pressure the Court to resolve this paradox. The
Court has no real alternative to finding a new path, unless it is content with
either ignoring its own Enforcement Clause jurisprudence or, bizarrely,
preventing Congress from participating in the same sexual orientation equality
project on which the Court itself has embarked. Nor is this a problem limited to
ENDA, or to sexual orientation discrimination more generally. Instead, it
extends to all forms of discrimination that have not yet been denominated
constitutionally suspect and either have attracted or will attract congressional
attention. This Part concludes the Article by laying out a template for
harmonizing the Court's new approach to equal protection with Enforcement
Clause doctrine. In essence, it considers how the Court can incorporate
Windsor's pointillist equal protection analysis into the congruence and
proportionality test.
B. The Way Forward
The key to resolving this issue lies, first, in understanding the difference
between constitutional doctrine and constitutional law, and second, in
according appropriate respect to legislation enforcing the latter. As scholars 178
176 See supra Part I.A (describing Coleman and Shelby County as potentially breaking
from traditional enforcement power doctrine).
177 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (delving into DOMA's legislative history and finding
its purpose was to interfere "with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages"); Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("A law branding one class of persons as criminal
based solely on the State's moral disapproval of that class ... runs contrary to the values of
the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause .... ."); Romer, 517 U.S. at 635
(disparaging the Colorado legislature's Amendment 2 as "a status based enactment divorced
from any factual context from which [the court] could discern a relationship to legitimate
state interests").
178 See generally Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1
(2004) (discussing such decision rules as a general feature of constitutional law).
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and judges 179 have recognized, the Court's suspect class doctrine reflects
constitutional doctrine - that is, a set of judicially manageable rules that seek
to apply underlying constitutional law, even if they are not themselves such
law. By contrast, the Court's approach in cases such as Windsor reflects a
much more direct, unmediated application of equal protection's core
requirement that the government not classify in pursuit of a purely private
interest, such as simple dislike of a group. This rule has not only driven many
of the Court's rational basis plus equal protection cases, 180 but has been
recognized as a foundational constitutional requirement transcending a
particular clause.18 Windsor directly engaged that rule. It examined DOMA,
including the statute's legislative history and even its title, and concluded that
it is "a law designed to injure the same class the State seeks to protect [that is,
persons in state-recognized same-sex marriages],' ' l82 whose "interference with
the equal dignity of same-sex marriages ... was more than an incidental
effect"'183 but rather "was its essence."'184 It buttressed this conclusion by
179 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2716 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]he modem tiers
of [equal protection] scrutiny . . . are a heuristic to help judges determine when
classifications have that 'fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation"' that
equal protection requires).
18' The Moreno-Cleburne-Romer trilogy, Justice O'Connor's equal protection opinion in
Lawrence, and the majority in Windsor all focus heavily on Moreno's famous statement that
"a bare ...desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest." Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534; see Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (quoting
this phrase from Moreno); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) (same); Romer, 517 U.S. at 634-35 (same); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 447 (1985) (same). To be sure, whether Lawrence or Windsor is
appropriately described as a rational basis plus case is open to question, given not only the
Court's silence on the level of review it was applying in those cases, but more importantly
its methodological approach that seems to abjure tiered scrutiny entirely. See Windsor, 133
S. Ct. at 2693 (holding DOMA unconstitutional without applying "fit" analysis or
identifying the appropriate level of scrutiny); Eric Berger, Lawrence's Stealth
Constitutionalism and Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765,
782 (2013) (indicating, in the due process context, that the Lawrence majority declined to
identify the scrutiny level it was applying, and suggesting the possibility that the Lawrence
Court "rejected the tiers-of-scrutiny framework entirely").
I1 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 61 (2001) ("[Tlhe
American constitutional tradition has long recognized a judicial authority, not necessarily
linked to any specifically enumerated guarantee, to invalidate truly arbitrary legislation.");
see also Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 608 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (acknowledging
the fundamental nature of the rule against government action in pursuit of purely private
interests); Powell, supra note 158, at 275 ("The baseline of the American constitutional
order is a government that acts rationally, but not merely in the sense that it has reasons for
what it does; rationality in traditional thought has also meant that government's actions are
undertaken in good faith and for reasons that are generally seen to be appropriate.").
182 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692.
183 Id. at 2693.
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observing DOMA's broad reach, impacting every right and responsibility that
flowed from a federal government recognition of a marriage,'85 and its
deviation from the normal federal practice of respecting state-law marriage
decisions. 186 While Windsor's observation about section 3's breadth echoed
Romer's similar concern about Amendment 2,187 Windsor is notable for its
failure to consider possible legitimate justifications for DOMA - a standard of
equal protection review analyzed by Romer 88 but not by Windsor.'189
What does Windsor's approach mean for the constitutionality of gay rights
enforcement legislation and, by extension, enforcement legislation benefitting
other groups whose suspect class status remain undecided? The Court's
enforcement power doctrine requires a court to examine the relationship
between enforcement legislation and the underlying, court-identified,
constitutional violation that the legislation targets. Windsor's approach to
DOMA's constitutionality - its failure to give DOMA heightened review
explicitly and its focus on the particularities of Congress's motivations - rather
than standard "fit" review' 90 - makes it difficult to measure that relationship.
The inevitable generality of any legislation means that a Congress considering
federal enforcement legislation would almost certainly draft it in general
terms. 91 But cases such as Windsor identify the targeted constitutional
violation with pinpoint - or pointillist - particularity.
184 Id.
181 Id. at 2694 ("Among the over 1,000 statutes and numerous federal regulations that
DOMA controls are laws pertaining to Social Security, housing, taxes, criminal sanctions,
copyright, and veterans' benefits.").
186 Id. at 2693 ("DOMA's unusual deviation from the usual tradition of recognizing and
accepting state definitions of marriage here operates to deprive same-sex couples of the
benefits and responsibilities that come with the federal recognition of their marriages.").
187 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 627 (1996) ("Sweeping and comprehensive is the
change in legal status effected by [Amendment 2].").
188 Id. at 635 (considering whether the justifications for Amendment 2, offered by the
state, lend legitimacy to the legislation).
189 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2708 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (exposing the majority's
failure to consider the arguments put forth by the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG)
party in defense of section 3). But see Young & Blondel, supra note 3, at 137-42
(suggesting that the majority at least implicitly considered some justifications for section 3).
190 See supra note 164 (quoting Chief Justice Roberts' statement in Windsor that the
majority's analysis of section 3 means nothing for judicial review of other marriage or
sexual orientation discrimination, given the majority's focus on the particular motivations
driving Congress to enact section 3).
191 This would not have to be the case, if, for example, enforcement legislation was
aimed at the action of a particular state, for example, a practice allowed by only one state in
the nation. But even in such a case, the enforcement legislation would likely be worded in a
generally applicable way, and its constitutionality would have to turn on whether the
targeted state action was, as a general matter, likely unconstitutional. See Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 645 n.3, 652-53 (1966) (acknowledging that section 4(e) of the
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Thus, the question: How can Windsor's pointillist approach to constitutional
law map onto or translate into judicial review of enforcement legislation?
Perhaps it cannot. Perhaps Windsor does not imply any additional
congressional enforcement authority to combat states' sexual orientation
discrimination. But, as Part II explains, that conclusion would lead to the odd,
hardly credible, and logically unacceptable result that consistent judicial
vindications of sexual orientation equal protection claims are irrelevant to the
constitutionality of congressional attempts to enforce the same constitutional
right. Another, more intuitive approach proposes that the decisions from
Romer to Windsor (including Lawrence) reveal a systemic constitutional
problem with sexual orientation discrimination, thus justifying more
deferential review of enforcement legislation on that topic. This approach,
however, amounts to a backdoor bestowal of suspect class status on sexual
orientation. 92 While such a bestowal might be welcome for reasons of
transparency and doctrinal coherence, the Court has conspicuously failed even
to consider the suspect class question ever since Justice Brennan called on the
Court to do so nearly thirty years ago.' 93 As explained previously, 194 Windsor
provided the Court with a logical opportunity to do so. Indeed, it presented the
unusual spectacle of both formal parties calling on the Court to address the
suspect class question. 195 Nevertheless, the Court again demurred, confirming
its long-standing disinterest in this approach. 96 Thus, this latter answer to the
translation problem simply is not responsive to the Court's own conduct.
The translation question therefore requires another answer. Inevitably, it
requires a court to translate Windsor's underlying approach into the
institutional context of legislative action. In particular, it requires a court to
consider how congressional deliberation on an enforcement statute might apply
Voting Rights Act was targeted at the protection of Puerto Rican voters in New York City,
but was nevertheless phrased more generally).
192 See Young & Blondel, supra note 3, at 144 ("Like Romer, Windsor leaves the strong
impression that same-sex couples share many of the indicia that make racial and gender
classifications suspect, even if the Court seems reluctant to say so outright."); ef Nev. Dep't
of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736-37 (2003) (upholding enforcement legislation
targeting state gender discrimination where the heightened level of scrutiny for gender
classifications allowed Congress to more easily identify a pattern of state violations
justifying enforcement legislation provision). Indeed, at least one lower court has read
Windsor as indicating that sexual orientation discrimination in fact does merit heightened
judicial scrutiny. See supra note 21.
193 Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (calling on the Court to decide the suspect class status
of sexual orientation discrimination).
194 See supra notes 130-38 and accompanying text.
195 See supra note 137.
196 See, e.g., GERSTMANN, supra note 28 (pronouncing the death of suspect class analysis
at the Court).
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the Windsor Court's reasoning. This would not entail Congress independently
interpreting the Constitution. The rule against animus is judicially derived, and
in adapting and applying Windsor's approach Congress would simply be
applying that rule. Of course, even that "mere" application of judicially stated
constitutional law would require judicial review. In turn, that judicial review
would require the Court to decide the difficult question of how deferentially to
review Congress's determinations. Leaving that last, difficult question to the
side, 197 the preliminary question is simply what a court should be looking for
when it reviews enforcement legislation targeting the type of antigay animus
the Court found in both Romer and Windsor, and that Justice O'Connor found
in Lawrence.
Answering that question requires carefully examining the relative
institutional legitimacy and capabilities of courts and Congress when
examining state government action for animus. This examination suggests a
promising line of thought: While courts may feel unable to reach broad
conclusions about whether a particular species of discrimination is infused
with animus, Congress may be better positioned to do just that.' 98 As the
institution whose nationwide representativeness, numerosity, and regularly
renewed electoral legitimacy render it most representative of the nation's
evolving sense of fairness, Congress should be presumed to have special
authority when it pronounces a particular species of discrimination to be so
fundamentally unfair as to reflect nothing but simple dislike - that is,
animus.199 Again, difficult questions might arise when a court seeks to decide
exactly how much deference to accord such congressional determinations. But
for now, if the question is simply how analysis such as that in Windsor can
map onto the distinct context of legislative action, it is appropriate to focus on
the significant institutional differences between courts and Congress when
each polices state action for compliance with equal protection principles.
Those differences point to a special role for Congress in identifying actions
motivated by animus. 200
197 See generally Araiza, Deference, supra note 34 (analyzing the question of how much
deference Congress should enjoy when it enacts legislation enforcing and limiting
individual rights).
198 See id at 935-38 (showing that courts are limited in the amount of factfinding that
they may perform in order to judge whether an example of differential treatment is
appropriate or not, and explaining why legislators are better suited for this factfinding
mission that results in enforcement legislation).
199 See id. at 923-25, 936 (explaining Congress's unique capacity and authority to find
facts relating to the enforcement of equal protection, and suggesting these characteristics of
legislative action call for judicial deference to such findings).
200 See id. at 923-25 (describing the institutional difference& which lead the Author to
conclude that legislators merit deference when reaching decisions concerning equal
protection enforcement). Of course, it is possible for Congress to fail to use its capabilities
to ferret out and correct instances of animus-motivated state government action. Indeed, if
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It is important for the Court to engage in the mapping process called for in
this Article. Failing to do so would disable Congress from participating fully in
the same process of constitutional construction with regard to sexual
orientation equality that the Court has engaged in since Romer. More
generally, it would disable Congress from responding to the equality claims of
other groups whose direct equal protection claims will likely be decided on the
same ad hoc and particularized grounds employed in Windsor. The approach
this Article proposes would allow Congress a meaningful role in enforcing the
rights the Court itself has identified as central to the principle of equal
protection. In particular, it adapts the enforcement power to the Court's new
equal protection jurisprudence reflected in Windsor. The next Section explains
this approach.
C. Adapting the Enforcement Power to Pointillist Constitutional
Jurisprudence
Two preliminary points bear repeating before elaborating on the approach
suggested above.201 First, the proposed approach addresses congressional
power to enact enforcement legislation targeting a group's constitutional right
to be free of animus-motivated state discrimination.20 2 Second, the institutional
Windsor's analysis is correct, then section 3 of DOMA reflects Congress indulging in
animus of its own. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) ("The history of
DOMA's enactment and its own text demonstrate that interference with the equal dignity of
same-sex marriages ... was ... [DOMA's] essence."). Nevertheless, the qualities discussed
in the text still give Congress special capabilities in uncovering and correcting state
government animus, and militate in favor of a strong enforcement power when it does so.
Still, there remains the possibility that enforcement legislation may in fact perversely reflect
or instantiate animus rather than correct it. In earlier work, the Author has discussed this
possibility and offered an approach to prevent it. See Araiza, Deference, supra note 34, at
909-10, 935-36, 950-51 (explaining how enforcement legislation that conflicts with the
Court's statement of core constitutional rules should be struck down as exceeding
Congress's enforcement power).
201 See supra Part III.B (introducing the approach the current Section explains more
fully).
202 Thus, this approach would not apply to enforcement legislation that sought to apply
other constitutional rules the Court has found in the Equal Protection Clause. For example, it
appears as though the Court has adopted an approach to race that finds in the Fourteenth
Amendment a strong presumptive commitment to color blindness. See, e.g., supra note 106
(citing a prominent scholar's conclusion on this point and a recent Supreme Court case
reaffirming it). This commitment is controversial among both scholars and judges. See, e.g.,
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 245 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court's review of race classifications should distinguish between
classifications that seek to include and those that seek to oppress); Ruth Colker, Anti-
Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003, 1007
(1986) (arguing that antisubordination should be understood as the Equal Protection
Clause's motivating principle). Nevertheless, it appears to reflect the current Court's
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difference between Congress and courts most relevant to this congressional
power is that Congress's nationwide representativeness, numerosity, and
constantly renewed electoral mandate render it better positioned to discern and,
crucially, to instantiate into generally applicable rules the values held by U.S.
citizens - in particular, estimations of the fundamental fairness (or lack
thereof) inherent in certain types of discrimination.
These observations combine to support broad congressional power to enact
enforcement legislation that reflects U.S. citizens' basic value judgments about
the fairness of particular types of discrimination. Consider the inquiry the
Court performed in Windsor: The Court examined the details of the statute in
order to determine whether its "principal purpose and ... necessary effect"
was to "demean" a particular group of persons.20 3 When translated into the
context of Congress's particular institutional characteristics - in particular, its
superior ability to legislate generally and to perceive and act on American
values - Windsor's approach suggests significant congressional competence
and legitimacy to enact enforcement legislation premised on such
conclusions.204 Put simply, if Windsor reflects a judicial method that looks
directly for animus where courts can find it - in unique statutes, enacted at
unique times and under unique circumstances - then the congressional power
to police against such constitutional violations should allow enforcement
legislation based on analogous but broader concerns about animus and
fundamental fairness.
The enforcement power latitude justified by Congress's institutional
characteristics does not mean an unreviewable enforcement power. An
unreviewable enforcement power would contradict Boerne's insistence that a
line exists between constitutional interpretation and constitutional
enforcement, with congressional power extending only to the latter.20 5 To be
sure, scholars have sharply criticized both this limitation on congressional
power and the idea of judicial supremacy that underlies it.206 Moreover, the
Court's seminal 1966 decision in Katzenbach v. Morgan broached a competing
vision, in which the Court shared with Congress not just enforcement but
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment's core constitutional rule regarding race. For
this reason, enforcement legislation addressing race discrimination would have to adapt
itself to the Court's core colorblindness rule, until the Court itself alters that rule.
203 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695.
204 See id.
205 See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (acknowledging that Congress
has the power to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, but not to "decree the
substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States").
206 See, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the
People: Juricentric Restrictions on the Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 2 (2003)
(criticizing the Supreme Court's imposition of "restrictive conditions on Congress's ability
to exercise Section 5 power," and the "Court's claim to an exclusive authority to interpret
the Constitution").
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interpretive power.20 7 In Boerne, however, Justices across the ideological
spectrum rejected that broader vision of congressional power.208 That rejection
is implicit in Boerne's congruence and proportionality standard, which this
Article takes as an assumed starting point for the future of the enforcement
power. 209
Still, the enforcement power theory sketched above raises serious questions
about whether it constitutes a de facto return to Katzenbach and its acceptance
of congressional power to enact into law Congress's own interpretation of the
Constitution. But, properly understood, this power is subject to significant
judicial review. First, and most notably, the Court retains the power to
determine the scope of the equal protection guarantee. Our modem
understanding of equal protection as an across-the-board guarantee of equality
for all persons with regard to all government actions arose only because
successive Courts interpreted it that way. They need not have. The Court could
have limited the guarantee to blacks,210 or to racial equality more generally, 211
or even just to groups rather than individuals. 212 It could also have limited the
equality guarantee to only the exercise of particular rights, most notably, the
rights enshrined in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.213 Indeed, it could also have
interpreted that guarantee simply as mandating equality in the protection of
rights - as, literally, a guarantee of the "equal protection of the laws" rather
207 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 656 (1966) ("[I]t is enough that we perceive a
basis upon which Congress might predicate a judgment that the application of New York's
English literacy requirement to deny the right to vote to a person with a sixth grade
education in Puerto Rican schools in which the language of instruction was other than
English constituted an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause."); id at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (critiquing the majority's approach); id. at 651
n. 10 (majority opinion responding to Justice Harlan's critique).
208 See supra note 47 (highlighting the broad agreement on the Court concerning the
adoption of the congruence and proportionality standard).
209 See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520 ("There must be a congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.").
210 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872) ("We doubt very much
whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a
class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this
provision.").
211 See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1879) (describing the Due
Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause together as "declaring that the law in the States
shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white,
shall stand equal before the laws of the States").
212 Cf Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (finding uncontroversial
the proposition that a plaintiff can state a valid equal protection claim as a "class of one").
213 See, e.g., RAouL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDIcIARY 169-92 (1977) (arguing that
the Fourteenth Amendment simply aimed at constitutionalizing the rights protected by the
Civil Rights Act of 1866).
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than "the protection of equal laws.' 214 The Court did none of this. As a matter
of core constitutional interpretation, a function Boerne reserves to the
judiciary, the Court has, instead, understood the clause as a generally
applicable guarantee that all government classifications be at least minimally
related to a legitimate government interest.2 15
Second, even congressional applications of this fundamental constitutional
rule of minimal relationship to a legitimate, public-regarding purpose remain
subject to judicial review. Judicial scrutiny, however, would focus on whether
Congress had used its particular institutional capabilities appropriately to
perform the type of analysis the Court itself appears to be performing as part of
its new style of equal protection review. In particular, judicial review would
examine whether enforcement legislation accurately reflected the current moral
views of the American people about the fundamental fairness of the type of
discrimination at issue. 216 Thus, courts would consider, for example, whether
the type of discrimination targeted by an enforcement statute had been rejected
by other government entities and civil society groups, as well as by the public.
This review would seek to ensure that enactment of the challenged legislation
reflected a societal consensus rejecting that discrimination, rather than an
idiosyncratic congressional victory for a group that had not successfully made
its equality argument to American society.
Such review would undoubtedly be difficult. Questions would arise about
which groups' opinions should matter the most, and how much of a consensus
would be necessary in order to uphold an enforcement statute.2 17 But the Court
214 See, e.g., John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101
YALE L.J. 1385, 1433-51 (1992) (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause is fundamentally
about the requirement that government provide equality in the protection for rights, rather
than in the rights themselves). The second phrase quoted in the text appears to come from
Justice Field's opinion in Yick Wo v. Hopkins. See 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) ("[T]he equal
protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws."); Harrison, supra, at 1390
(identifying Yick Wo as the source for what he called this "piece of textual sleight of hand").
215 The requirement that the government interest be legitimate excludes animus or other
private-regarding ends as appropriate goals government may legitimately pursue. See, e.g.,
Powell, supra note 158 (explaining this requirement).
216 This provision for enforcement legislation reflecting the current views of U.S.
citizens does not suggest that the constitutional rule itself changes. By definition, such
evolving views occur at the level of enforcement of the constitutional rule, not its
interpretation. The rule itself - against animus-based discrimination - does not change.
Compare, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) (identifying
society's "evolving standards of decency" when considering whether a particular
punishment violates the Eighth Amendment), with Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36, 72 (1872) (acknowledging that the deterioration of peonage or "coolie" systems
to the point that they constituted slavery would trigger the Thirteenth Amendment's
prohibition).
217 Many of these questions have been raised in response to what seems at first blush to
be the analogous Supreme Court practice of "counting the states" to determine whether a
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must ask these questions because, as reflected in Windsor, its own approach to
underlying equal protection questions has changed. That change - away from
heavy reliance on suspect class analysis and toward more precisely targeted
examination of a statute's compliance with equal protection's core public
purpose requirement - has undermined its current approach to Enforcement
Clause cases, which relies heavily on that now seemingly abandoned suspect
class methodology. Windsor makes this abandonment all the more emphatic.
As such, it only increases pressure on the Court to alter its Enforcement Clause
jurisprudence accordingly.
D. Application
The ENDA 218 presents a timely example of how this approach would play
out.2 19 A court considering the ENDA - for simplicity's sake considered here
in its stripped-down form, without transgender protections - would have to
inquire whether American society had evolved to the point that it considers
sexual orientation-based employment discrimination fundamentally
inconsistent with equal protection's promise that discrimination must be
justified by something other than mere dislike of the burdened group. In
reviewing whether Congress had appropriately reached that conclusion, a court
would consider the policies and practices of employers across the United
States. In contrast with the approach in Garrett, this inquiry would apply to not
just state government employers, but also to private employers.220 This broader
inquiry is justified because the review proposed in this Article seeks to answer
national consensus had developed that a particular punishment is cruel and unusual and thus
violates the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of
Federalism: The Illogic of Using State Legislation as Evidence of an Evolving National
Consensus, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 1091-92 (2006) (critiquing this approach as indeterminate
and inconsistent with federalism's promise of states' autonomy to select their own policies).
An important difference between the Supreme Court's use of this method in the Eighth
Amendment area and this Article's proposal is that this Article gives the "counting"
decision in the first instance to Congress, through its perception of a national consensus as
filtered through the national democratic process. While judicial review of enforcement
legislation would review that perception, it would not do so as the Court does in the Eighth
Amendment area - that is, in the first instance, as an unelected Court rejecting policies of
states perceived to constitute a minority. Rather, judicial review in our context would check
the use by the nationally accountable federal legislature of its explicit power to police states
by enacting enforcement legislation.
218 Employment Non-Discrimination Act, H.R. 1755, 113th Cong. (2013).
219 In November 2013, the Senate passed the ENDA by a bipartisan vote of sixty-four to
thirty-two. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://
www.hrc.org/laws-and-legislation/federal-legislation/employment-non-discrimination-act
(last visited Nov. 14, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/M3P7-6KFL.
220 See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 369 (2001) (refusing to
consider the history of disability-based employment discrimination engaged in by private
employers, and even by subunits of state governments).
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a fundamentally different question than did the review in Garrett. The relevant
question would not be, as Garrett asked, whether states were engaging in
conduct that a court applying the decisional rule of rational basis scrutiny
would hold unconstitutional. 221 Rather, the proper question would be whether
American society had condemned a particular practice - here, sexual
orientation-based employment discrimination - as violating the constitutional
rule against animus.
A court reviewing the ENDA would also examine other evidence. Did major
civil society groups condemn sexual orientation-based exclusion from other
basic arenas of social life? For example, the prevalence of sexual orientation
protection in states' and municipalities' public accommodation ordinances,
while not directly probative of a national consensus on employment
discrimination, is relevant to public opinion about whether sexual orientation is
a relevant discriminatory criterion with regard to inclusion in social life more
generally. For this reason, other, more general nondiscrimination provisions -
for example, those governing membership in unions, schools, and professional
organizations - would also be relevant, if only indirectly, to ENDA's
constitutionality. For a similar reason, statements by major social groups about
the acceptability of such discrimination - for example, statements by affinity
groups and political parties - would also matter, even if those groups did not
engage in the workplace activities the ENDA would regulate.
This approach should not elicit the objection that, by soliciting opinion from
a wide variety of social groups, it stacks the deck in favor of elite opinion.222
First, such groups come in all shapes and ideologies, from corporations to
universities to ethnic and social affinity groups. If performed appropriately,
judicial review of such opinions should not systematically skew one way or the
other. Second, and more importantly, it bears recalling that such review would
become necessary only if Congress in fact enacted a piece of enforcement
legislation. Thus, nonelite opinion would already have validated the fairness
judgment instantiated in that legislation, to the extent such opinion is
accurately reflected in antidiscrimination legislation that successfully runs the
federal lawmaking gauntlet.223
221 See id. at 365 (examining "the limitations § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment places on
States' treatment of the disabled").
222 Cf Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652-53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (complaining
that the Court, by finding a Colorado antigay law to be based on animus, had adopted the
views of elite opinion in condemning the views of the people of Colorado).
223 Of course, one can always question the extent to which congressional action reflects
constituents' values, as opposed to the preferences of narrower interest groups or even
legislators' own preference maximizations. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith,
Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: An
Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1730 (2002) (listing several factors that may
influence legislators' actions beyond constituent preferences). Examples are probably of
limited use in considering this objection: anecdotal evidence that changes in public opinion
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One benefit of this methodology is that it contains within it a built-in
limiting mechanism. If national consensus - however defined, and with the
admitted difficulty in discerning it - becomes the relevant test for enforcement
legislation, then one might expect enforcement legislation to be upheld when it
reflects views society is already putting into practice. State governments are
part of that society; indeed, for many defenders of judicially protected
federalism, states are worth protecting exactly because states are thought to be
more responsive to local opinion.224 If judicial review of enforcement
legislation asks, fundamentally, whether American society has condemned the
type of discrimination the statute attacks, then such review likely will validate
legislation to the extent that state and local governments have already taken the
lead.
Obviously, the enforcement power implicates serious federalism issues, in
addition to issues about the proper allocation of power between Congress and
the courts. The approach sketched out here truly respects federalism by
focusing enforcement power review, in part, on how states among other
entities have applied the Court's understanding of the underlying right - here,
the right to be free of animus-motivated discrimination. In a very real way, it
reflects a positive, cooperative federalism, by allowing states a role in
determining how constitutional obligations are imposed on them. That role
necessarily must be indirect and limited: ultimately, it is for the Court to
determine the meaning of those obligations and for both the Court and
Congress to enforce them. But an approach to judicial review of enforcement
legislation that seeks to translate the vague, Court-identified antianimus rule
on some issues has led to changes in legislators' positions that can be countered with other
stories of congressional action that seems to fly in the face of public opinion. For example,
the pollster and statistician Nate Silver has suggested that national public opinion on same-
sex marriage caused some portion of the large shift in favor of same-sex marriage by many
Senators. See Nate Silver, Explaining the Senate's Surge in Support for Same-Sex Marriage,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2013, 8:13 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/04/
explaining-the-senates-surge-in-support-for-same-sex-marriage/?_r=0, archived at http://
perma.cc/366L-J8EW. By contrast, political reporters have noted that the public strongly
supported the gun control measures that were nevertheless defeated in the Senate in early
2013. See Paul Steinhauser, Public Opinion Gets Trumped in Gun Control Defeat,
POLmcALTICKER (Apr. 17, 2013, 6:15 PM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2013/04/
17/public-opinion-gets-trumped-in-gun-control-defeat, archived at http://perma.cc/E6VY-
T2N3. Concededly, the "defeat" the gun control bill suffered in 2013 was simply the failure
of the bill to receive a super majority; the bill received fifty-four votes. See id At the highly
general level required by the broad constitutional analysis this Article performs, perhaps the
best we can say is that the imprimatur of congressional enactment is likely one of the most
reliable indications that a particular policy or judgment enjoys the approbation of the
American people.
224 See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 570-71 (1985)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (approving of Hamilton's and Madison's federalist views that
citizens' ties, loyalties, and familiarity lie with the states).
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into concrete rules of conduct must consider what American society
understands as animus.
States, as part of that society - indeed, as entities thought to be closer to
local opinion than distant federal representatives 225 - can play a useful role
when the Court reviews Congress's translation work. Such an approach is
surely superior to the antagonistic federalism that marks the Court's current
approach to enforcement power cases. To see this, one need only contrast the
result under this approach with the one promoted by the dissenters in Hibbs,
who attacked the enforcement power basis for the FMLA's family-care
provisions exactly because states had already provided for family medical
leave.226 This latter approach exacerbates the mistake of the Court's juricentric
approach to the enforcement power reflected in the Kimel-Garrett-Hibbs line
of cases, 227 by focusing on the extent to which states have or have not violated
the constitutional command, rather than on how states, as part of and reflective
of American society, understand that command. Put simply, preventing
Congress from acting on a national consensus condemning a particular type of
discrimination because states have already acted on that consensus is to turn
federalism from a cooperative enterprise into an unnecessarily antagonistic
one.
CONCLUSION: THE CHALLENGE OF POINTILLIST CONSTITUTIONALISM
Art historians tell us that pointillism is aimed at reproducing an accurate
depiction of reality through the application of tiny dots of pure color. When
filtered through human perception, those dots allow viewers to perceive the
nuanced picture of light and shadow and color variations that exist in the
world.228 But without an infinite number of surrounding dots, any given
pointillist dot fails to reveal that true reality. 229 Windsor is a pointillist opinion:
By finding a core constitutional violation in the details of a particular statute, it
marks a tiny dot of pure constitutional color. Indeed, just as a pointillist
painting reminds viewers of the basic building blocks of our visual
perception, 230 Windsor's precise focus on equal protection's core antianimus
225 See supra note 224.
226 See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 750-51 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the majority's position because "the States appear to have been ahead
of Congress in providing gender-neutral family leave benefits").
227 See supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing the "juricentric" approach of
the Court in Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence).
228 See supra note 163.
229 Cf United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2697 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(describing the majority's analysis as saying little or nothing about the constitutionality of
other examples of sexual orientation discrimination).
230 See, e.g., Francisco Letelier, Notes on Pointillism, COLOR THEORY SPRING 2008 (Mar.
5, 2008, 10:14 AM), http://fleteliercolortheory.blogspot.com/2008/03/notes-on-pointillism.
html, archived at http://perma.cc/38U6-SHUN (explaining this idea).
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requirement provides a beneficial service by reminding both lawyers and
citizens of what, at base, the Equal Protection Clause is all about.
Legislation, however, is by definition a work characterized by broad
brushstrokes of mixed pigments. A doctrinal mandate that enforcement
legislation be congruent and proportional to the underlying constitutional
violation creates tension when, as with sexual orientation (and likely other
classifications), the Court depicts that violation with a pointillist's brush. Thus,
the challenge for Enforcement Clause doctrine is to recognize that Congress
and the Court sometimes paint in different styles. Each style may be
appropriate to the institution that employs it, and each style may faithfully
reflect constitutional reality. But each is nevertheless distinct.
It may well be appropriate for the Court to require that enforcement
legislation have some relation to court-stated law; at least this Article assumes
the existence of that requirement. But if Windsor does ultimately herald a new
style of equal protection analysis, even for only a discrete category of
challenges, the Court will have to develop a method for translating broad
congressional enforcement brushstrokes into its own evolving interest in a very
different style of constitutional art.
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